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STUDIESof local public finance are typically replete with such alarm-
ing terms as crisis, problems, and emergency. The spirit of urgency
permeates them. The dismal prophecies, if drastic remedial steps are
not taken, are of slum-ridden cities, inadequately educated future
generations, traffic clogged and abandoned central business districts,
water-thirsty cities, mass flights to less encumbered areas, and
patronizing and unpopular intervention of the federal government.
Despite the fact that most of the nation's wealth is located in the
metropolitan areas, a great part of the difficulties of local govern-
ments is attributed to their fiscal condition. Why, when the city1
is the focus of economic activity, its residents have a more than
proportionate share of the national income, its property is far more
valuable than the nonurban sectors, it is the market place where most
transactions occur, its fiscal base is far greater than other parts of the
nation, must its governments operate under crisis conditions?
What are the sources of these crises? Are they becoming more
critical? These are the questions of this paper.
There is a tendency to view the fiscal problems of metropolitan
areas as a function of the very heavy burdens imposed upon the
taxpayers because of the expanded public facilities necessary to serve
the booming urban population. However, not only has the growth in
urban wealth kept pace with the growth in urban population, but
the fraction of the nation's income which is locally taxed has fallen.
Table 1 shows the trend in local real public expenditures as a per-
centage of real gross national product over the past 25years.In
recent years there has been a slight increase in local expenditures, but
Note: This paper was written with the assistance of the Real Estate Research Program,
University of California, Berkeley.
1Thefollowing convention on terms will be followed. "City" refers to the urbanized
area. "Municipality" refers to a part of the city incorporated under one government.
Suburbs, satellites, and central cities are municipalities.The metropolitan area or
region is the standard metropolitan area of the census.
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TABLE I
Real Local Revenues and Expenditures















SOURCES: Local revenues and expenditures: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of
Governments Advance Release, Governmental Finances in the United States 1902 to
1957, March 1959. Table 6 for current data; p. 2 for price deflators.
Real gross national product: Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report to the
President, January 1959, p. 143.
the level is far below that of the prewar years. The fiscal crisis of
local governments takes the conventional form—the search for tax
sources; but more basic is the question of why public support has
fallen behind previous levels. Perhaps part of the reason is a resistance
to all taxes because of the large growth in the federal budget. In this
paper I intend to explore some of the causes of the crises as they
emerge from the structure of the city and its government.
The city is a densely settled area which is economically dependent
upon other areas. It is always dependent on other areas for food,
since its density precludes agricultural production, and it is frequently
dependent for raw materials for production and markets for its
products. The city as an aggregate is part of the division of labor
in the economy, but more important for our problems is the differen-
tiation of functions which occur within the city. The economic units
which comprise the city—the households and firms—are functionally
and spatially differentiated. The organization of functionally differen-
tiated economic units into an economy which satisfies the needs of
the people has been the central topic of economic analysis. Spatial
differentiation has been neglected, but herein lies the core of the
metropolitan finance problems.
Differentiation and specialization in economic functions make
increasing efficiency possible, but at the same time they give rise to
costs of organization. In the economy, the possible chaos which
might arise because of functional differentiation is overcome by the
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organization of markets. The pull of the market leads to shifts of
units so as to result in a tolerably efficient production and distribution
pattern. Even where the market is nonexistent, as within the adminis-
trative structure of firms, pecuniary evaluations of inputs and, outputs
which are derived from the market greatly facilitate the efficient
organization of the firm.
Spatial differentiation, like functional differentiation, leads to the
need for organization, but the role of the market as a spatial organiz-
ing force is quite different. Spatial differentiation refers to the fact
that every activity must occupy a unique site within the city. Each site
is unique since each bears a different distance and thereby time and
cost relationship to any other site within the city. How shall the
functionally differentiated economic units be distributed among the
sites—or to put it in more conventional terms, how shall the sites be
distributed among the different users? A market organization is one
technique. Economic units bid for the site and in a way similar to that
of labor or coal, land will be allocated to the higher bidders. But this
form of an organization, though it is important, is minor compared
to the other institutions which have developed to enable the city to
function.
Governments perform the vital organizing role within the city.
Though the activities of governments go far beyond those necessary
to provide a structure to organize the spatially differentiated activi-
ties, many of the governments' activities arise because of the high
social costs of using a market organization. At the minimum we could
say that the inefficiency of the market is sufficiently great that even
in an economy as ours, where the ideology of the market is so all-
pervasive, there have been no serious proposals to replace govern-
ment by a market organization. On the contrary, the role of the
market has been steadily declining.
Space is an input which supports productive activities including
the amenities of consumption, but at the same time it is an obstacle
which must be overcome in order to communicate or transport.
Though the same is true of every other input—e.g., labor is an input
but it must be supervised; machines are inputs but they must be
maintained—space has the peculiar feature that the use of the land
input by• one economic unit affects its costs as space to all other
economic units. Furthermore, the input value of any site is partially
determined by its accessibility, which in turn is affected by the space
uses of all other units. The most obvious illustration of this problem
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is that of entry and egress. One site completely surrounded by other
sites has little value unless the interior site-user has rights of passage
over other sites. A very elaborate body of common law has developed
around the rights and duties of adjacent land owners, and there exists
market transactions which deal with influencing the uses of sites other
than your own, but the dominant agency which is used to organize
accessibility (and thereby the usefulness of sites) is the government.
Streets are probably the most significant factor in urban organiza-
tion. Though one can imagine a private company providing street
services where they would at a price link up each site with a common
pattern of streets, comparable to the services provided by a telephone
company, the cumbersomeness and inefficiency of this market
organization would rule it out as a possible solution. Even telephone,
water, and sanitation, when privately organized, have to be endowed
with special government powers to establish their rights of way over
property, in order to connect sites. Public streets are the most
impressive instance of government organization of a spatially
differentiated area. With low density and extensive land use, a
private market might arrange for accessibility. With high density
and intensive land use, the government arranges the facilities.
•Similar to streets, we have the development of other public services
to permit this high density development to survive—fire protection,
sanitation, water development, police protection, etc. Though the
government has established the basic functions which permit the city
to develop, there is an active private market in the allocation of the
sites which have been created and arranged by the government. Then,
the market allocates the sites according to the profit productivities
for firms and their living amenities for households.
The individual units as economic entities adapt themselves to
government patterns, but the individual units also function as
politicalentities. The public organization provides a necessary
framework for an urban development and the residents as citizens
influence the framework. As part of the political process, the indi-
viduals establish governments, manage. functions, support expendi-
ture, control programs, and assess taxes on themselves. As individuals
they play both roles, political and economic, to realize their goals,
selfish or altruistic. The fiscal problems of metropolitan areas are
political as well as economic since they are concerned with the
political and economic behavior of the individuals. Can the govern-
ment effectively establish a framework for economic and social
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activity within the city? Do the economic incentives of the individuals
i.e., a comparison of the benefits they receive and the costs they incur,
inhibit or facilitate the development of a government organization of
the city? Does the structure of government—its limited territorial
jurisdiction, functional specialization, restricted fiscal tools—inhibit
it as an efficient organization?
2.
Though the city at any given moment of time is composed of sites
with unique locational characteristics, the sites are highly substitut-
ible. The patterns of substitution are prominent features of the
metropolitan fiscal problem. The degree of substitution among sites
has not been analyzed but there are several hypotheses which seem
reasonable in the light of the many specific land-use studies. It is rare
that an unchangeable topographic feature dictates a specific land use.
The most obvious case would be docking facilities along a river or
bay. Even these, in most cases, could have been located at many other
points along the water front. Once the port facilities are established,
the possibilities of substitution among sites are far more restricted.
The street pattern has become adjusted to the present location;
rail freight facilities have been constructed; the multitude of necessary
service industries have located themselves in view of the current
port location. A shipping company which seeks a site outside of this
complex for a docking facility would find itself denied all of these
linkages which are necessary for its operation. In the short run, since
complementary facilities are not mobile, high substitutibility among
sites is restricted to neighborhoods. The same restrictions to neighbor-
hoods exist for almost all other land uses in the city. Industrial usages
are in industrial parks or areas; the department stores and office
buildings are downtown. Within any given neighborhood the short-
term substitutibiity of sites is great and there exist very imperfect
substitutions among neighborhoods. In the long run (for city struc-
tures the long run is extremely long) almost all sites are good sub-
stitutes. Long-run adjustments are hindered by the long life of public
and private structures and the adjustments are facilitated by rapid
growth. But neighborhoods exist whether they are in short-run or
long-run equilibrium. This neighborhood pattern has serious implica-
tions for the fiscal problems of metropolitan areas. In fact, most
analysts attribute the major source of the fiscal difficulties of the
municipal governments contained within the metropolitan area to
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the partitioning of the metropolitan area into municipal governments
which rule over different neighborhoods of the metropolitan area.
A neighborhood within a city is not a simple homogeneous area,
though frequently the structures are similar. The locational advantages
of an area for one activity will frequently hold for many similar
activities so that branches of industry, transport, retailing, and types
of residences will cluster together. Not only do these uses share
common locational interests, but also there are strong forces to
retain their concentration: they share many economies in efficient
contact with suppliers and servicing firms which can reach efficient
size if they are located near a large group of similar firms. Similarly,
the firms' marketing role is enhanced if prospective purchasers can
easily visit several firms. Many small firms, when located nearby, can
economize on inventories if they can borrow from each other; they can
reduce excess capacity if they can easily subcontract rush or large
orders; they can reduce labor costs if the neighborhood attracts a
standby supply of temporary workers. The same neighborhood
effects extend to residences. The amenities of household residences
such as parks, schools, neighbors, reduced traffic, and handy shop-
ping are more efficiently supplied for clusters of residences rat.her than
for a scatter, interspersed among many other uses. For households,
neighborhood effects take on the additional attribute that the resident
derives utility not only from his house but also from the character
of his neighbors' structures and even their behavior—the play
patterns of the children, the sociability of the wives, etc. Clusters of
similar uses in a city create neighborhoods and within a neighborhood,
sites are highly substitutible. And in the long run, neighborhoods
themselves could have been located at many points within the city.
With the growth of the mctropolitan area, shifts in current neigh-
borhood location patterns will arise.
A major determinant of the distribution of the neighborhoods of the
city is the accessibility pattern. Those units which assign the greatest
value to accessibility, the retailers, competitively bid up the price of
sites in the center. The units which find the value of accessibility less
crucial cannot outbid the retailers and therefore settle at points more
distant than the center. The factor of general accessibility sets the
pattern of rates in the center, but retail trade does not account for
the majority of the central land uses. There are no authoritative
studies of the central business district, but the study of Cincinnati
which shows that retailing and business services have about the same
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total floor area is typical.2 The business services includes usages such
as: employment agencies, financial and insurance firms, legal and
accounting firms,etc. Together, retailing and business services
accounted for slightly less than half of the floor space. 8
Thoughall sites in the central business district are prepared to pay
the high costs of rent in this area this is not because of its great
general accessibility. Many business services require special accessibi-
lity to those units which require general accessibility. But whatever
the motives of entry into the central business district, the many
individual sites are highly substitutible for use by retail trade and
central offices which enter the CBD and pay high prices for space there
because of its general accessibility. The high prices in turn must be
paid by those who do not value the general accessibility.
The differences in accessibility needs are in turn related to different
demands placed upon the public organization of the city. The retailer
requires rapid transit channels for shoppers and truckers and other
amenities for shoppers such as close parking and pleasant walks,
while the business services may require alleys for messengers,
restaurants for conferences, and all-day parking for workers. The
stores have large inventories to be protected, large shopping crowds
to be moved; the business services have large all-day working forces
relative to space. Public services capacity-requirements for these two
types of users are quite different. Of course, the central business
district at any given moment is far more complex. The point of peak
accessibility and peak land values is constantly shifting. In its wake
it leaves an area of declining land values and converted buildings.
In its path there usually lies an area of better hotels, speciality shops,
etc.3 All that I want to establish here is the different facilities needed
by the occupants of the neighborhood.
The conflicts over public policy by residents with different needs
and incomes is significant for the fiscal status of the city. Consider
the ever-recurring conflict over residential densities and zoning.
There is a constant effort to maintain the amenities of uncrowded
living by government sponsored rules to limit occupancy rates per
acre. The usual standards deal with establishing minimum size lots,
number of floors in an apartment house, or minimum open space on a
2Theancinnati Central Business District Space Use Study, A Summary, Cincinnati
City Planning Commission, 1956, pp. 1—2, 18.
See an analysis of nine central business districts contained in R. E. Murphy, J. E.




Hypothetical Relationship Between Housing Expenditures,









Class Families to Income ExpendituresExpenditures Income
5,000 100 .20 1,000 $100,000 $500,000
10,000 50 .18 1,800 90,000 500,000
20,000 25 .16 3,200 80,000 500,000
25,000 20 .14 3,500 70,000 500,000
50,000 10 .10 5,000 50,000 500,000
building lot. In any case, the policy advocated for the government is
to restrict density. This policy, though often adopted in a planning
code is constantly frustrated in practice. The frustration of the policy
arises because of the pressure of the market. The efforts to maintain
the policy have implications for local finance.
Land which has greater accessibility is more valuable. This is true
for residential sites as well as commercial and industrial. Their
greater value arises because of the greater demand; individuals in
order to avoid the costs of the lack of accessibility are willing to
pay heavier for housing. The value of accessibility is significantly
related to income. The lower incomes have fewer cars and can afford
fewer trips with their cars. They also must be located closer to a
variety of job possibilities since their jobs are less certain. When we plot
the distribution of personal incomes on a gradient from the city
center, ignoring the very wealthy apartment houses located at the
center, we find that income rises with distance from the center. The
poor are more centrally located. One of the reasons is that they can
displace the rich. As income rises, the ratio of housing expenditure
to income falls. As illustrated in Table 2, the lower incomes, because
they are prepared to pay a higher per cent of their incomes in housing
expenditures and live in more dense conditions, can outbid the upper
incomes for sites. If the rich originally lived in the area analyzed in
Table 2, it is to be expected that they would sell out. This process is
familiar—the cOnversion of the town mansion to flats and finally
rooms. The rich sell and move farther out where the accessibility
costs are higher and where the lower incomes are discouraged from
following. Though higher access.ibility costs provide some protection
to the rich, it is not sufficient. There is a dispersion of industrial
plants throughout the city and an appreciable part of the lower in-
comes with job security and without the need of other job possibilities,
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might be tempted to follow the rich in search of cheaper land.
To protect themselves against the inadequate barrier of high accessi-
bility costs, the rich must impose zoning regulations in which they
jointly deny themselves the possibilities of capital gains in the sale
of their properties to the poor. Is this ordinance which restrains
their freedom of action efficient from their perspective?
Some form of public controls are necessary if they are to maintain
their properties. Men, when they buy homes, associate the amenities
of the neighborhood with the home itself. Dense occupancy in
adjoining blocks by lower income groups reduces the enjoyment of
their homes. Of course they can sell out, realize a handsome capital
gain, and relocate. Therefore, there has to be a personal advantage
for them to accept willingly the self-denying zoning ordinance.
One explanation may li.e in the discontinuities which exist in available
sites. Frequently, if one neighborhood is to be abandoned and
another established, a lengthy leap to a new site may be necessary.
There are no readily available areas which are only slightly less
accessible. The move may be one of many miles with subsequent
disruption of old neighborhood ties—church memberships, tennis
clubs, school associations, etc. As the constant conversion from
higher to lower income housing demonstrates, the differences in
capital gains and the inability to maintain neighborhood solidarity
has forced the rich to more and more distant points. Today, in the
largest of the cities where the growth of population and its sprawl
has become so great that a large per cent of the population lives
outside the limits of the central municipality, the suburban city
incomes are greater than those of the central city.
Municipalities or neighborhoods on the periphery of the metro-
politan area are far from being solely refuges of the rich from the
competitive, high-density bidding of the poor. Industry is fairly
widely dispersed in the city and there are neighborhoods of workers
in the periphery who constantly threaten the cheaper lands of the
rich neighborhoods. The threat of higher density creates conflicting
demands on public policy. The accessibility needs of the two neigh-
borhoods as well as their attitudes towards density and industrial
location are quite different. The richer tend to commute to the central
core of the city while the lower incomes work much closer to home.4
See R. F. Whiting, "Home-to-Work Relationship of Workers Living in Public
Housing Projects in Chicago," Land Economics, August 1952, p. 287; and Report on the
DetroitMetropolitanArea Traffic Study, Part I, J. D. Carroll, Jr., July 1955, pp. 95—i.
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The problem of intra- and inter-neighborhood conflicts can be
posed in its simplest form as an imbalanced distribution of taxes and
the benefits of public services. Consider the property tax which is
the mainstay of the local tax system. An extension of a public service
will usually mean an increase in property tax rates. If the public
services provide benefits equal in value to the taxes to be paid,
the value of the property will remain unaffected. Fixed annual
payments by the property owners will be increased by the tax and
they will receive a set of services which in the aggregate are equal
in value to the tax costs. However, this is too simple a story. The
taxes do not support services which generate an equal set of benefits
for each resident. Far from it. The benefits of the public services
might be freely available to all land users in the area, but not all
land users might be equally inclined to use the public services. For
those who are disinclined, the services represent a fixed annual cost
not compensated by an equal benefit. Benefits from services and the
costs in the form of taxes may balance so as to leave the aggregate
of property values unaffected, but there may be a redistribution effect
which might prevent agreements about public services.
A similar analysis can be applied to the central business district.
Transportation and parking and shopping amenities are critical for
its expansion and growth. These improvements in accessibility if made
will enhance the value of property, not only of the department store
and central office buildings, but of adjoining land which contains
substitute sites. Therefore, taxes need not lead to declines in values,
possibly they may lead to an increase. Annual costs of holding
property have gone up and so will rents. Business service units which
require only linkages to the other units in the CBD need not directly
benefit from the increase in accessibility. If they do not, then they are
paying for an undesired service. Clearly, many of the business services
are not so benefited.
The mechanics of unequal distribution of benefits and gains from
some form of economic change, as described above, are widespread
throughout a competitive economy. In the normal operations of a
competitive private market economy, the redistribution of incomes
does not lead to a frustration of economic change. If the department
stores initiated credit departments they would hire more clerks to
operate them. Their increased demand for clerks would force an
increase in wages of clerks and a resultant increase in clerical costs
for all other firms in the same labor market area, the central business
238METROPOLITAN FINANCE PROBLEMS
district. This is the working of the competitive process. In the case of
an increase in public inputs to enhance accessibility there is one major
difference. The unbenefited firm has a right to vote whether any unit
should have increased benefits and costs. It is as though the non-
department stores, recognizing that the introduction of credit
facilities in department stores would lead to an increase in clerical
costs, had a vote in determining whether department stores could
introduce credit offices. A vote by all land users in an area, or
members of an industry, on the pecuniary external diseconomies
associated with the growth of one of the land users or members
would result in a vetoing of the expansion plans. This procedure is
occasionally followed in some industries; it is the general practice in
cities. The inhibitions on policy exercised by the veto power of those
who suffer pecuniary external diseconomies is true for all govern-
ments. Taxes are not assessed in proportion to benefits received, but
the frustrations of government reach an acute form in the metro-
politan area where governments are smaller; their actions more
visible; where specific public services are more directly related to tax
payments; and where a multiplicity of governments compounds the
difficulties of agreement.
In the above context, the principal fiscal problem of the metro-
politan area is the difficulty of public decision-making. The resources
of the metropolitan area are great. The needs have not become
unsupportable. However, the ability to organize the public framework
has become weakened because of an increasingly ineffective govern-
mental structure of which financial problems are only symptomatic.
3.
Theconflict between the beneficiaries and the taxpayers illustrated
in the above pages is similar to that stressed by several writers on the
normative theory of public expenditures who have discussed the
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of determining an optimum pattern
of public expenditures. These writings were normative—in contrast,
the purpose of this paper is positivistic.
The normative analysis is directed toward two questions: When
should the government displace private production? What are the
conditions for an optimal level of public services? These are not our
questions which are concerned with explaining actual expenditures.
However, the normative analysis does suggest interesting hypotheses
for the study of behavior.
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It is argued that one of the cases where the government should
intervene is where the product cannot be packaged so as to exclude
certain users and therefore if it is produced it must be made equally
available to all. In this case, a consumer will not voluntarily purchase
the commodity but instead will allow others to. purchase and then
enjoy the product without payment. Therefore, no one will make the
necessary payment since everyone will wait for his neighbor to act.
The public is assumed astute enough to recognize this dilemma and
therefore individually they are willing to allow the government to
force all of them to make "fair" payments in order to produce this
commodity. It is further argued that the level of services will not be
optimal since the consumers will never reveal their true preferences
for the commodity, as judged by the amount of funds they would
sacrifice for the public service. The only way tha.t they could reveal
their true preferences is if the electoral system would allow them to
cast as ballots not only ayes and nays but ballots which list the
amounts they would be willing to subscribe for the services. This
would result in the same situation which frustrates the private sector
in providing the services. Individuals would offer less than their true
estimate of the service, hoping that others would subscribe sufficient
to provide the service which would be freely available for all. There-
fore, the government must rely on a compulsory tax structure in
which tax payments are not necessarily related to the values placed
by the consumers on the services.
An extension of the logic of the argument of the public expenditure
theorists is that if an optimal set of expenditures is not presented to
the voters, then there will be some who will oppose the bill. Despite
the opposition the bill will be carried if at least half of those voting
prefer the situation with the bill to the situation without the measure.
The political criterion of accepting a measure is therefore quite
different from the criterion adopted by the welfare economists.
Any situation A might be politically acceptable compared to a
situation B though the welfare economist might not be able to
compare these two situations since it might involve redistributions of
income. On the surface it would seem simple to find politically
acceptable solutions where at least one-half of the population is
improved. These agreements are more numerous than the solution
of the welfare economist who insists that there is an improvement
only if all of the population is at least indifferent or better off. But
there are forces which militate against and facilitate the development
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of a politically acceptable solution. Recent trends in the metropolitan
area are making politically acceptable solutions more difficult.
One factor which sharply reduces the area of possible agreement
is the issue of equity. For the welfare economic theorist, every public
service is to be welcomed if someone is better off, and no one is
worse off with the introduction or expansion of the public service.
This allows possible situations where some persons are made very
well off while others only slightly or not at all. To accept the welfare
economists' criterion, some persons, and for many of the solutions
possibly most of the persons, would have to agree to a reduction in
their relative income status. Therefore, many persons who might
favor a public service would refuse to support it if they felt that it
would benefit others "inordinately." This would lead to a severe
reduction in the range of politically acceptable solutions. In fact,
the introduction of comparative judgment rather than simply judging
a situation in terms of one's own income without considering the
income of one's neighbors, if done without the introduction of
majority rule, might lead to situations where there are no acceptable
solutions. It is not inconceivable that the residents of suburbs and all
the neighborhoods of the central city might each individually demand
of a proposed improvement in public services that each of their
relative statuses should improve. If the improved relative status is
not forthcoming, each of the groups might prefer the status quo.
Therefore, envying-equity considerations would sharply reduce the
set of acceptable solutions, since individuals are concerned with
both the absolute and relative levels of their incomes. It would be
reasonable to argue that the more equitable the distribution of
income and wealth, the more easy will it be to agree on efficient
solutions since considerations of equity and status will be less
significant. This factor is not trivial when we consider the marked
divergency in income and social class among the suburbs and central
cities of a metropolitan area.
Equity considerations of relative status narrow the range of
acceptable solutions. Majority rule expands the range far beyond the
optimal set. We will now observe how joint products, uncertainty,
and moral sentiments greatly expand the set of acceptable choices.
The normal pattern of public choice is one of choosing a package
rather than a single product. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the
greater the number of products offered in the package to the voter
the greater the likelihood of adoption. Even if the voting scheme
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were balloting with subscriptions, the strategy of many projects
rather than one is more likely to be carried. It is clearly a better
strategy for the government when the balloting is by yes or no and a
majority or specific percentage of votes is required for adoption. The
success of the multipurpose package is based upon the existence of
consumers' surpluses of enough voters for specific projects so that
they are wiffing to endorse the entire package rather than lose the
specific project.
The bulk of decisions in regard to public services are not made by
referenda, but instead are made through legislative processes. In this
case the same sort of phenomena holds. The public exerts their
influence on the formation of specific legislative acts either through
direct action, as in the case of pressure groups, or, more generally,
indirectly, through the election of legislators. In this case the elected
official represents a very complex package. It is in the official's
interest to create enough surpluses within his voting constituency
to assure himself a majority of the vote.
Uncertainty is another significant factor in accounting for the
acceptability of public services. There are many dimensions to
uncertainty, but the element I want to stress is ignorance. Many
governments are very complex, and the more complex the govern-
ment the easier will it be for it to expand public services. The com-
plexity of government, in addition to providing more variables for
the political leader to juggle in order to shape a package acceptable
to voters, provides a protective smokescreen for the public adminis-
trators through which the citizens cannot penetrate.
Another determinant of the range of acceptable public services
even more seriously affects the strategy of political choice. Factors
such as uncertainty and multiple products make individual com-
putations and valuations of the elements of a public policy extremely
difficult.Generally,voters,rather than acting as hard-headed
shoppers, adopt ideological positions toward the whole program.
The strategy of the voter may take the form of accepting the leader-
ship of a political party, of a community group, of the primacy of
principles, etc. The substitution of ideologies for self-interest as the
basis of the support of a program is similar to the adoption by
consumers of such strategies as brand preference, trusting a store-
keeper, etc. In the case of the private sphere, advertising and habit
replace calculation. In the case of the public sphere, political per-
suasion replaces rational self-interest. The restraint on government
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which might develop because of rational self-interest is thereby reduced.
The reliance upon ideology, in effect, substitutes a sense of public
responsibility for self-interest. This is too narrow a concept of
the morality of individuals acting as citizens.It may be true
that individuals are prepared to sacrifice self-interest when faced
by moral questions posed by public actions. This is not questioned.
All that I wish to establish is that even if individuals were totally
self-interested, their lack of knowledge would lead them to evaluate
public actions on the basis of ideologies rather than calculations.
Whichever motivation for this type of evaluation dominates, the
introduction of ideologies greatly increases the freedom of the
government in acting. The set of public policies acceptable to the
voting public is increased.
The consequence of the forces which expand the set of acceptable
programs is to permit the government of the city greater freedom in
seeking out compromises. It is easier for the government to assess
taxes and it is easier for the government to expand services than if
only rational self-interest ruled. Ignorance and the acceptance of
majority rule permit the resolution of conflicts by the political pro-
cesses of persuasion and negotiation, while knowledge of consequences
and their implications for one's own self-interest would lead to
a frustration of policy by focusing on possibly irreconcilable conflicts.
Though ideological and utopian thinking become important in
political decision-making, this does not mean an abandonment of
self4nterest. It is just that both enter into the public support of a
program. The conflict between the social and private evaluations is
reflected in the answers to a recent survey of Detroit-area residents
on their attitudes toward government activities. They were asked
whether the government is doing too much, too little, or the right
amount in areas such as unemployment, education, and housing.
Only 7 per cent thought that the government was doing too much
while 40 per cent thought that the government was not doing enough.
When the respondents were asked to compare the worth of govern-
ment services to the contribution that the public must make for them,
the support of the government dropped. Twenty-nine per cent
thought that the government asks for more than it provides for the
public, while only 13 per cent thought that the public gets more from
the government than it pays. The support of the government dropped
even further when the question became even more pointed and asked
whether they should pay more or less taxes considering what they
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get from the government. Forty-one per cent thought that taxes were
too high, while only 2 per cent thought taxes were too low.5 These
respondents were prepared to give overwhelming support to an
extension of government so long as they were not subjected to the
pressures of pecuniary evaluation of costs. Consistent with the above
finding, we find the popular demands for the expansion of individual
services associated with the sen.se of frustration about the inability to
restrain the total.
The first section of the paper indicated some of the dimensions of
conflict which existed among the individuals who use the sites of a
city and the difficulties of resolution by a tax-supported government.
The second section of the paper discussed some of the attributes of
the government decision-making pattern which enables the govern-
ment to establish an organization for the city despite individual
conflicts. In the next sections we will analyze the structure of govern-
ment of the city and try to assess its ability to resolve the conflicts
of site users.
4.
The lack of consensus which creates obstacles for governments is
partially overcome by the special nature of political decision-making
described in the previous section. The political process counteracts
the voters' constraint on government which arises because of
interest. The structure of governments in the metropolitan area
rather than helping to overcome the voters' constraints, aggravates
the problems posed by conflicting interests. It is reasonable to expect
that local governments would have more severe fiscal difficulties
than central governments simply because knowledge and thereby
self-interest can play a more significant role in local governments.
The degree to which self-interest leads to the frustration of political
action is increased by the functional and territorial balkanization of
the metropolitan area.
Whereas the design of a policy containing many issues permits
the development of a stable majority to support it, in local financing
there are many single-function governments, e.g., education which
precludes the possibility of adding voting strength by promising more
voters more benefits. Similarly, territorial restrictions have the same
effects.
M. Janowitz, D. Wright, and W. Delaney, Public Administration and the Public,
Perspectives Toward Government in a Metropolitan Community, University of Michigan
Government Studies, No. 36, 1958, p. 36.
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The Arrow6 voting paradox is the classic demonstration of the
inability of getting a majority to decide on what is best, if the pre-
ferences of the voters are inconsistent. Arrow demonstrated that
under certain conditions a group might cast a majority of votes for
choice A when compared to B, and another majority might favor
choice B when compared to C, and that it is possible that a majority
of votes from the same group would be cast for C when compared
to A. In this case, which is based upon a ranking of preferences
for alternatives by individuals which are completely at variance, no
single issue could receive a stable majority support. Policy would be
frustrated. There are many reasons in actual practice why stable
majorities would arise. One of the most important is that there does
exist a great deal of agreement among many persons about the
rankings of many issues. But unless there is complete agreement
about preferences among all individuals in the city, itis usually
possible to assign individuals to groups, give each group one vote,
and then return to the original condition of not having a stable
majority. Table 3 demonstrates this possibility.
The first part of Table 3 lists the preferences of a five-individual
city, A, B, C, D, E, where each resident ranks his preferences among
in the order given. In this case, there is no possibility of a majority
preference. If any A', is put to a vote there will always be three people
6K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, Wiley, 1951.
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who would prefer some other X2.Thisis true for everyso that a
stable majority is impossible. If three people should by chance vote
for somethen someone could propose anotherforwhich three
persons would also vote. This instability arises because of the dia-
metrically opposed preference orderings of the individuals, which we
would not expect to find in nature. The orderings illustrated in Part
II of the table are more likely to be found.
In Part II there is a stable majority for A'4. No matter what alter-
native is posed in opposition to A'4, a majority would vote for A'4.
In fact all the choices would be stable, or, to use the more technical
language, transitive, i.e., A'4 is preferred to A'2, A'2 is preferred to
A'5, X5 is preferred to A'3, and A'3 is preferred to Anysingle
alternative if preferred to another is also preferred to all alternatives
which are not preferred to that other. It is likely that this may be the
more typical situation. Of course, not every one is happy with this
final order of preferences of the group. Individual A, who places A'4
low in his order of preferences, will be an active minority opposition.
But he has no hopes of upsetting the majority votes. A decision can
be taken by our five-man city, and this decision will be stable so long
as they agree to accept the results of majority voting. This stability
is lost, once the city becomes partitioned into certain combinations
of separate governments.
Part III of the table illustrates the return of the voting dilemma
after the partitioning of the five-man city into one combination of
separate governments. Individuals B, D, and E are now joined in
one government with one vote, while A and C represent two indepen-
dent governments. If votes are now assigned, one to each government,
there will be no stable majority among the governments, though the
underlying preference orderings of the individual voters would have
allowed for a stable majority. In the case of voting by governments,
A'4 which is the stable majority of the individuals, would lose in a vote
against A'3. This would hold despite the poor showing of A'3 in the
voting choices of individuals. When all individuals voted as citizens
of one city, A'3 would have been defeated by all alternatives except X1.
The problem of achieving a stable majority translates itself into an
important metropolitan area problem: The metropolitan area is
divided into a great many governmental units. A multitude of
governments, per Se, is not a problem. After all there are many
thousands of groceries, drug stores, etc., in any given metropolitan
area. In the case of governments, the territorial and functional
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divisions create difficulties. The organization of a city is a public
function which requires consistent planning for the entire area.
There is a strong tendency for neighborhoods of a metropolitan area
to become municipalities. If all of the municipalities were identical,
then the possibilities of an agreement about common organizational
problems would not be endangered by territorialpartitioning.
Instead, municipalities have widely diverging socioeconomic charac-
teristics so that the interests of any given municipality may diverge
greatly from the interests of many of the others. The possibilities of a
successful exploitation of the rich fiscal resources available in the city
are reduced by the difficulties of agreement among the municipalities.
In the 178 standard metropolitan areas, there are 15,658 govern-
ments. This is an average of 90 governments per standard metro-
politan area, 18.3 governments per 100,000 persons. Though this
seems to• be a large number, it is small compared to the area outside
the SMA. In the rural areas, there are 133 governments per 100,000
persons. Within the SMA's there are large stretches of rural territory,
since the boundaries of the SMA are the county lines, no matter how
far the county limits are from the urban area. The central counties of
the SMA would approximate most closely an urban area. The central
counties average 56 governments or 14 governments per 100,000
persons. As the SMA grows in population, the governments do not
increase proportionally. The five most populous urban areas are on
the average 71 times larger than the average area of 50—100,000
inhabitants, but they only average 16 times asmany governments.
Governments per capita in the largest areas are slightly less than
1/5 of the figure for the smallest SMA's. Some type of economies of
scale are present though it is not obvious whether they are based upon
politics, the technology of supply of public services, or the economic
advantages of a larger service area for a unit.
Though the very large number of governments are accounted for
by the many school and special districts which abound in local
governments, municipal governments themselves are still numerous.
There are 3,422 municipalities in the 178 standard metropolitan
areas. School districts were almost twice as numerous as the
municipalities and special districts appeared almost as frequently.7
Though the number of municipal governments is quite large, the bulk
'Thestatistics on the frequency of governments in the standard metropolitan areas
are taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Governments: 1957, Vol. I,
No. 2, Local Government in Standard Metropolitan Areas, 1957.
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TABLE 4
Number of Municipalities and Their Population
in the Standard Metropolitan Areas in 1957
Percentage of Population
of Municipally Governed
Population Size of Number of Area of Standard
Municipalities Municipalities Metropolitan Areas
50,000 or more 234 79
25,000—49,999 104 6
10,000—24,999 289 7
5,000— 9,999 386 4
2,500— 4,999 419 2
1,000— 2,499 753 2
Under 1,000 1,237 1
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Census, Local Government in Standard Metropolitan Areas,
1957, p. 6.
of them govern small areas and account for a small percentage of
the urban population as can be seen in Table 4.
Though the bulk of the metropolitan population resides in the few
large municipalities, the metropolitan area problem is not simply a
big-city problem. First, the population of noncentral cities is growing
relative to the central cities. Second, for many areas the central cities
haveaminor part of the population of the standard metropolitan areas.
As can be expected, the municipalities are highly diverse, with far
greater differences existing among the satellites than among the
central cities. Table 5givesone dimension of the great diversity which
exists—suburban cities tend either to be highly residential,or,
interestingly enough, almost as frequently highly industrial. All cities
of over 10,000 population in the SMA's of over 500,000 were classified
by central or noncentral, and by the ratio of jobs in manufacturing
and trade to the number of residents employed in those industries.
The lower the ratio the more likely that the residents of the city in
those industries have to go elsewhere to work. For the bulk of cities
it is likely that this ratio can be used to classify the municipality as an
employment or residential center. A high ratio would indicate an
industrial city and a low ratio would mean a dormitory city.
The differences in the municipality economic characteristic most
relevant tofiscal problems—the employment-residence ratio—is
striking. Though most of the population of central cities are located
in municipalities which are moderately a greater source of employ-
ment in manufacturing and trade than their supply of residents for
those industries, there are appreciably large numbers of central cities
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which export labor for those industries and others which import
large numbers. The central cities show a marked bunching around
a moderate job surplus status. The suburbs show an altogether
different pattern. Rather than a balanced employment-residence
structure being dominant, more than half of the population of suburbs
reside in suburbs which can be characterized as highly specialized
as dormitories or employment centers. The importance of suburbs
as industrial satellites has been overlooked in the general tendency
to view suburbs as the homing place of the central city workers.
One out of five suburban residents of cities over 10,000 live in cities
where local manufacturing and retail jobs are almost 50 per cent
greater (and usually a higher percentage) than the number of residents
who work in these industries.
The extreme diversity of suburbs has two aspects of interest. It is
apparent that no simple generalizations can be made about the
differences between central cities and suburbs. It is true that if a
person lives in a residential city he most likely lives in a suburb,
but it is also true that if he lives in a highly industrialized municipality
he also most likely lives in a suburb. The too—easy generalization
about the suburbs as dormitories and central cities as production
centers is incorrect. The suburbs can be considered a collection of the
many types of neighborhoods which exist in the urban area, with each
neighborhood usually having its own government, although many
suburban municipalities have more than one neighborhood. The one
neighborhood which will not be found as a suburban municipality is
the central office district, the major shopping centers, the entertain-
ment and restaurant district. The suburban municipalities are not
only distinguished by job-resident ratios, but also by income levels,
rental levels, birth rates, educational levels, proximity to central
city limits, occupational characteristics, and so forth.
The existence of neighborhoods as cities has the consequence of
gathering into one government unit the individuals who have rela-
tively similar preference orderings and who, as a group, tend to have
orderings which are distinct from other groups. This has the effect of
reducing the possibilities of agreement on public programs in a
metropolitan area. Within any neighborhood there may be sufficient
similarity for a stable majority to develop (and it is possible that a
stable majority could be developed for the entire urban area), but
partitioning the metropolitan area into cohesive sectors where each



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Rate of Increase in Population,










Total United States 14.5 7.2 16.1 14.9 21.0
Nonmetropolitan 6.1 8.5 6.0 6.7 13.6
Metropolitan 22.0 8.4 27.5 25.9 32.5
Central Cities 13.8 5.5 24.2 27.9 37.1
Rings 34.2 13.4 33.2 22.4 25.6
Urban 26.0 8.0 42.6 35.9 49.2
Rural 45.2 21.3 22.0 9.4 8.4
Incorporated 34.1 13.2 28.6 24.1 45.0
Unincorporated 46.5 22.3 21.2 7.8 5.6
SouRcE: Leo F. Schnore, "Metropolitan Growth and Decentralization," American
Journal of Sociology, September 1957, p. 172.
This reduction weakens the opportunities for the residents of the
metropolitan area to use their superior fiscal capacity to carry out
the necessary organization of the metropolitan area.
Is this differentiation increasing? Are the prospects for agreements
worsening? The evidence is not clear. The most noticeable signs
point to increasing differentiation. Suburbs are growing relative to
central cities, central cities are becoming more dissimilar from the
suburbs, and suburbs are increasing their distinctiveness.
Table 6 shows the changing trends in location of population growth
in the metropolitan area. Metropolitan areas have consistently grown
relative to the rest of the United States. Within the urban area, the
suburbs, highly differentiated, have over time absorbed an increasingly
larger percentage of the urban growth. In the years since the last
census, this higher rate of growth by the suburbs has been maintained
if not accelerated. Table 7 shows the distributions of building permits
for 1954 to 1957 between central cities and the rest of the metropoli-
tan area by type of construction. The shift of the population to the
suburbs is indicated by the 70.6 per cent of the value of new dwelling
units which are being located outside of central cities. The dominance
of the noncentral areas in other types of construction is not as great,
but they all indicate the relative growth of the noncentral. Industrial
buildings permits are divided almost the same as residential. Only in
constructiqn for the clearly central-city functions, i.e., office building,
institutional buildings, and commercial garages, are the central cities
growing more rapidly than the noncentral. Although industrial
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TABLE 7
Value of Building Permits Issued in Metropolitan Areas, 1954—57
DISTRIBUTION OF TYPE OF
CONSTRUCTION BY PLACE, IMPORTANCEOF TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION













All building construction 38.7 61.3 100.0 100.0 100.0
New dwelling units 29.4 70.6 57.2 43.4 65.9
New nonresidential bldg. 48.7 51.3 32.6 41.0 27.3
Commerce building 56.9 43.1 10.9 16.1 7.7
Amusement 52.6 47.3 .6 .8 .5
Commercial garages 75.9 24.1 .4 .7 .1
Gas & serv. stations 43.6 56.4 .7 .7 .6
Office buildings 72.8 27.2 4.5 8.5 2.0
Stores 43.0 57.0 5.2 5.7 4.8
Community building 49.8 50.2 11.0 14.1 9.0
Education building 45.2 54.8 6.8 7.9 6.1
Institution building 67.4 32.6 2.1 3.6 1.1











Public utility 54.0 46.0 1.6 2.2 1.2
All other non-
residential 43.8 56.2 2.2 2.4 2.0
Additions, alterations,
and repairs 59.1 40.9 9.5 14.7 6.2
SOURCE: Various May issues of The Construction Review, U.S. Department of Commerce and
Labor.
buildings are divided almost in. the same proportion as residential
building and stores and other mercantile buildings are more than
half in noncentral areas, this does not mean that the suburban
growth is necessarily balanced. As indicated earlier, suburbs are
highly differentiated, and it is pertinent to ask whether the growth of
suburbs, which is balanced in the aggregate, results in an increase
or decrease in the degree of differentiation.
Table 8 details the increase in population between 1948 and 1954
in different types of suburban cities over 10,000 in SMA's over
500,000. The table indicates that the suburban cities are retaining
their pattern of differentiation and possibly accentuating it. Were
there an equalizing movement, the balanced cities should have
grown relatively more rapidly than other types of cities. Instead,
the balanced cities, as defined by either 1948 or 1954 indices, grew
the slowest. By far the lowest growth was experienced by balanced
cities which remained balanced. The cities which retained their same
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TABLE 8




















Dormitory cities 76.8 15.6 23.7 24.1
Total 18.7 9.0 24.4 18.7
SouRcE: Work sheets of Jones and Coilver, op.cit.
aBy1954 and 1948 ratios of jobs in trade and manufacturing in city to residents
employed in same industries.Suburban cities over 10,000instandard metropolitan
areas of over 500,000.
TABLE 9
Distribution of Population of Suburban Cities in 1948 and 1954a
A.PERCENTAGE OF 1954SUBURBAN POPULATION
1948Ratio 1954 Ratio Classification
Classification Employing Balanced Dormitory Total
Employing 20.5 5.9 1.5 27.9
Balanced 4.4 15.5 6.1 26.1
Dormitory 1.4 3.5 41.1 46.0
Total 26.3 24.9 48.8 100.0
B. PERCENTAGEOF 1948SUBURBAN POPULATION
1948 Ratio 1954 Ratio Classification
Classification Employing Balanced Dormitory Total
Employing 20.9 5.3 1.4 27.6
Balanced 4.4 18.2 5.7 28.3
Dormitory .9 3.6 39.4 44.0
Total 26.3 27.1 46.5 100.0
SOURCE: Work sheets of Jones and Coliver, op cit.
&By1954 and 1948 ratios of jobs in trade and manufacturing in city to residents
employed in same industries. Suburban cities over 10,000 in standard metropolitan
areas of over 500,000.
classification in both years grew the least. This is to be expected,
since a large increase in population will have a temporary unhalancing
effect, so that the economic character of the municipality will change.
The population of cities with constant classification grew by 16.5
per cent, while the population of those cities which changed classifica-
tion grew by 27.1 per cent. The greatest rates of population growth
were registered in the dormitory cities whether classified by 1948 or
1954 indices. The continued pattern of differentiation is reinforced by
Table 9 which shows the distribution of the 1954 and 1948 suburban
population by type of city.
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TABLE 10
Land Area and Population of
Finances, 1942, Vol. 3, pp.
McGraw-Hill, 1933, pp. 336—9.
Incorporated Places of 2,500 or
200—9; R. D. McKenzie, The
The growth of the noncentral part of the metropolitan area relative
to the central has been the repeated theme of hundreds of reports and
conferences on metropolitan
in population
fiscal problems. Frequently this shift
with mass movements of
people who, once they have automobiles, feel free to abandon their
crowded urban quarters to live expansively in the wide-open areas of
a green suburbia. This decentralization is not an accurate depiction
of the facts. There has not been an evacuation of the central areas for
the periphery. The typical evidence dealing with decentralization is
similar to Table 6 which shows the increasing rates of growth of
the suburbs with declining rates of growth of the central city. There
is nothing in this sort of evidence which is inconsistent withthe
hypothesis that population is normally distributed over an area and
that each successive stage in a growth trend is also normally distri-
buted.
Part of the phenomenon of decentralization is based upon the
change in the pattern o.f area growth of cities. Table 10 summarizes
some of the data on the area growth of the cities which had a pop ula-
tion of 100,000 or over in 1930. From1900 to 1950, the population
of these 91 cities increased by 153 per cent and their areas increased
by 83 per cent. As we can expect, the densities of these larger cities
have grown. Over time, the population growth has tended to have
the same general shape as the area growth with a somewhat greater
concentrationof area growth in the early
254
decades of the century.
by Size of
Distribution of Area and Area Growth
Cities for Cities of over 100,000 Population in 1930
Percentage of Total Area Percentage of 1950
Size of City Growth during the Period 1900—1950 Total Area by
by Population Attributed to Population Size-Class Population Size
(thousands) of City at Time of Growth of City in 1950
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Undoubtedly, this unequal development of area and population has
contributed to the identification of the year 1920 as the turning point
in the growth of decentralization, though as we have seen the concept
of decentralization is poorly defined.
Table 10 shows the area growth between 1900 and 1950 of the cities
which had a population of over 100,000 in 1930. The first column
analyzes the area growth of these cities according to their population
size when they acquired additional acreage. The figures entered in
the column are the percentages of the total area growth of the 91
cities distributed among the cities according to their population size
when the annexations took place. The first item, 8.5, means that 8.5
per cent of the total area growth between 1900 and 1950 of all 91
cities was incurred when these cities had a population of under
50,000. The column understates the area growth of cities under
50,000 during this period since the percentages only refer to the
growth of cities which reached 100,000 in 1930. Some cities under
50,000 in this period grew and reached 100,000 after 1930 but they
would not be included in the table. The important point about the
table is that though in each decade the areas of the large cities have
been growing, lagging behind population but growing, there is little
area growth of cities beyond the 500,000 population size. The 17
cities which had populations of over 500,000 in 1950 were only 19
per cent of the 91 cities analyzed, but they contained 47 per cent of
both the area and population of this group of cities. It is this very
important group of cities for which we can expect very little in the
way of area growth. They are hemmed in by already incorporated
areas which will zealously retain their identity. In the future, we can
expect in these major urban areas a very rapid increase in noncentral
populations relative to the increase in population in the central cities.
Given the pattern of distribution of population increase among the
suburban cities of the large metropolitan areas which was analyzed in
the preceding tables, the difficulties of agreements about the mobiliza-
tion of fiscal resources will most likely increase in the future.
The municipalities of the metropolitan area are becoming more
diverse. Industry and residences and shopping centers are not
distributed randomly among the municipalities. Cries of inequity,
conflicting competition for fiscal resources, appeals to higher govern-
ment, creations of new governments become common. The next
sections will discuss some of the problems in more detail and the
fiscal reactions of local governments.
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5.
Discussionof the problems created by the increasing partitioning
of the metropolitan area into ever-larger and more numerous muni-
cipality-neighborhoods is too frequently restricted to one issue—
equity. Equity is important. Municipalities are less prone to cooperate
in a sensible organization of the metropolitan problem if they feel
that other municipalities are liable to reap most of the benefits, even
if they should benefit somewhat. Solutions to metropolitan problems
must consider equity, but they must also consider how best to find
agreements when there are real conflicts of interest. Furthermore, even
if conflicts were nonexi.stent, the structure of suburban governments
handicaps the possibility of political action to expand public services.
The major arguments about equity are concerned with the central
city vs. suburbs. The central cities argue that the suburbanite crowds
their streets, demands police and fire protection while he shops and
works, and then retreats outside the municipal boundaries into his
valuable residential property, which the central cities believe should
be taxed to pay for these public services. The suburban governments
argue that they must educate the boom baby crop of the commuter;
they must protect his family and his property, but the lucrative tax
base which should support these services—the factories and office
buildings—are located in the central city. Both sectors of the metro-
politan area deplore their partial access to the taxable property of the
metropolitan area, and both feel a sense of deprivation which they
hope can be rectified by changes where each can achieve an improve-
ment in their relative standings.
The only substantial evidence to support the claim of suburban
exploitation of the central city has been the study of Amos Hawley.8
He showed that the per capita public expenditures of central cities
increase as the percentage of the population of the standard metro-
politan area which lives in the central city declines. The central cities
which comprise the smallest part of their metropolitan areas have
the highest per capita public expenditures. This finding, which was
based upon municipal expenditures and which could be challenged
since it ignores the many differences in the use of special district
governments among cities, is confirmed when we use the data on
government payrolls of all local governments overlying central cities.
Table 11 presents the data for the 36 largest standard metropolitan
BA.H. Hawley, "Metropolitan Population and Municipal Government Expenditures







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































areas. The first column gives the per capita payrolls by groups of
central cities with different ratios of central city to total urban area
populations. The differences among the groups are not striking but
it is clear that the greater the outside population relative to the resi-
dents of the central city, the greater will be the central cities' local
public expenditures. The per capita public payrolls of the standard
metropolitan areas do not bear the same relationship as do those of
their central cities, which lends credence to the inference that the
central city public expenditures relationship is a function of its
outside population, and not some special characteristics of the area
or region. This "inequity" is of special interest since the future
booming growth of urban areas will result in central cities having
still smaller shares of the metropolitan population and therefore
incurring still larger public expenditures relative to the suburbs.
The last three columns of Table 11 evaluate the significance of the
payroll differentials. The first shows the ratios of central city public
payrolls to those of the entire SMA. The expected relationship
holds—the ratio of per capita central city public payrolls to those of
the total SMA increases as the percentage of the total urban popula-
tion which resides in the central city falls. Differences in expenditures
show that public costs per resident are greater as the population
outside the central city grows, and therefore they indicate that the
central city services a population much larger than its residents.
Clearly, as the central city becomes a smaller part of the metropolitan
area it is likely that it will contain a relatively larger share of the
employment of the SMA and with, this increased daytime population
its local public costs would rise. This expectation is confirmed by the
data of Table 12 which shows that the employment-resident ratio of
the central city rises as its share of the population of the urbanized
area falls. However, the large daytime population of the central city
and the con sequent higher public .expenditures does not necessarily
mean a higher tax burden on the residents. Associated with an increase
in daytime economic activities of the central cities there may be larger
fiscal capacities to support additional public services. The remaining
two columns of Table 11 are partial indices of the fiscal capacities of
the central cities of the 36 standard metropolitan areas. In only one
of the four groups do the fiscal capacities fall appreciably below the
expenditures indices. The evidence is too partial to allow for any
clear conclusions about who exploits whom. But the fact that central
cities contain a larger per capita tax base casts doubt on the validity
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TABLE 12
Distribution of Urbanized Areas





























Total No. 21 21 28 44 29 143
SOURCES: Work sheets of Jones and Coilver, op.cit.; D. Bogue, op.cit.
of any inference drawn from their higher expenditure ratios. Retail
sales and employment are important indices of fiscal capacity but
they are far from complete. Family incomes are higher outside the
central city than inside, for the larger metropolitan areas. It is likely
that value of residence per family is also higher. But the higher
valued residences are often offset by the greater per capita industrial
and commercial property.
The argument that central cities are exploited by the noncentral
cities is not well established. If anything, central cities may be rela-
tively better off. Other alleged inequities within the metropolitan area
may have a better basis in fact, and these may prove the obstacle
to efficient fiscal arrangeinents.
A typical set of suburbs may include an industrial satellite with a
low-income, densely settled residential district with an old shopping
district; an upper-income suburb where zoning might exclude all
commerce and industry and set a minimum-sized building lot of
one or more acres; a middle-income city with shopping districts,
minimum-sized lots of modest dimensions, and constantly on the
lookout for clean industry; a lower-income city with aggressive plans
to attract industry. The upper incomes commute to the central city.
The lower incomes work in the industrial satellites or in plants on
the periphery of the central city closest to the suburb. The middle-
income group is mixed, containing central business district commuters
and managers of peripherally located businesses. The demands for
public services by these suburbs, and their fiscal capacities, are quite
different. Fiscal inequities exist, but more important are the supposed
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TABLE 13
























Business suburbs 3,890 4,688 53.60 .0138
Higher income 4,495 5,156 53.35 .0119
Lower income 3,647 4,502 53.70 .0147
Dormitory suburbs 4,864 5,598 43.66 .0090
Higher income 5,809 6,692 49.19 .0085
Lower income 3,930 4,517 38.19 .0097
,, SOURCE: See J. Margolis, "Municipal Fiscal Structure in a Metropolitan Region,
Journal of Political Economy, June 1957, pp. 23 1—2 for methodology. Some of the
numbers in the above table do not agree with the numbers in the article. Not all of the
cities in the Bay Area could be used for the above table since income could not be
estimated for some.
or real inequities of any proposed changes in the development of the
metropolitan area which attempts to treat all persons and muni-
cipalities in a uniform manner. For instance, a mass transportation
plan with an orientation toward the central business district may
provide great benefits to those suburbs containing the commuters—
the upper- and middle-income sub urbs—but they provide few
benefits to the low-income suburbanite who does not work in the
central business district. Frequently, the operations of these proposed
programs require a subsidy by a property tax which might involve
agreements by many municipalities. The unbenefited, but taxed,
are not likely to agree.
In addition to conflicts among the governments, there is the further
complicating factor that many of the municipalities might be too
small and simple in structure to allow for the political flexibility
necessary to extend public services. Table 13 shows some fiscal data
for the cities of one metropolitan area, the San Francisco Bay Area,
which casts some light on problems of equity and fiscal adaptability
in the suburban areas. The business suburbs are those which have
a substantial residential population and have local employment at
least close to that of their resident labor force. They do not include
the heavily industrialized sateffites which are factory towns with
very little residential development. The dormitories have few local
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jobs relative to the resident labor force. The differences in fiscal
behavior among the suburbs is very marked. The dormitories have
higher household incomes and higher per capita real property than
the business dormitories, but their municipal expenditures per
capita are appreciably less. Income differences in the case of dormi-
tories lead to substantial differences in the levels of their municipal
expenditures. The lower-income dormitories make a greater effort
in terms of their incomes, but they still fall far behind the level of the
higher-income dormitories. Both groups make a distinctly lower
effort than the central cities or business suburbs. The latter group
spends the same amount per capita independent of the level of
income or value of property in their city. The low-income business
suburbs make a much greater effort than the higher-income business
suburbs to achieve the same magnitude of expenditures. The full
explanation of the magnitudes of expenditures is beyond the scope
of this paper, but the inability or the unwillingness of the dormitory
suburbs to make the same efforts as the business suburbs is, I fee],
explainable. My argument in the earlier sections of this paper stressed
that the more complex the government the easier it is for the political
leadership to expand its level of services. This is applicable here.
The lower-income business suburbs achieve the same standards of
services as the higher-income business suburbs though it means a
much greater effort for them. The lower-income dormitory suburbs
do not achieve the same expenditure levels as the upper-income
suburb though they make a slightly greater effort. They do not
approximate the efforts of the lower-income business suburbs though
their per capita incomes are greater and their per capita real property
values are the same. The inference seems clear that the more complex
governments find it easier to muster the public support necessary
to extend the level of public services despite the greater sacrifice
required. The continuing dominance of the dormitory suburb among
the noncentral municipalities prophesies a perennial shortage of
funds for the new and rapidly expanding municipalities of suburbia.
6.
The creation of many municipal neighborhoods isonly one
dimension in the balkanization of the metropolitan area. Another
has been the development of special-purpose governments. Histori-
cally, municipal governments expanded the scope of their functions
to displace bodies which administered single functions. Today, there
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is a possibility that we may be returning to the earlier pattern. One
solution offered to overcome the frustration of policy because of
the too many small municipalities is to develop special governments
which would have authority over an area large enough to handle
the problems posed by the great interdependencies which exist
within a metropolitan area. This has been especially true for such
functions as water,sanitation, bridges, port development, and
recreation. It is true that the larger jurisdictional area of these govern-
ments will enable them to better serve a planning role, but their
specialized character which insulates them from some of the normal
political processes of the metropolitan area may prove a handicap.
In previous sections,Istressed that governments with many
functions may find it easierraise funds by taxation. The voters'
constraints could be eased by the development of a program with
many services which could provide surpluses for a majority of the
voters, and the uncertainty surrounding a complex program might
enervate the opposition. If thisisso, the single-purpose special
districts may not find themselves with sufficient fiscal strength to
fulfill their goals. One test of the reasonableness of this suspicion is
the status of the largest group of single-purpose governments in the
country—the school districts.
The school district, as a government, performs one function,
education. Its territorial jurisdiction is usually small. These attributes
permit the voters to have some knowledge of the scope and nature
of its activities. It is not too difficult to become familiar with its
activities, and it is easy for many individuals to relate what they
believe is their self-interest to the functioning of the school. Support
of schools is not restricted to those who have children in the schools.
On the contrary, there is some evidence that the level of education
of the voters is a better determinant of how they vote on school
fiscal issues than the number of children of school age. Whatever
the basis of individual support of an educational budget, the voters
can readily develop a negative or positive attitude toward the extension
of the school budget. Under these conditions, it is not surprising
that schools are the major fiscal problems of local governments
despite the nation's best organized public pressure groups—the
parents and teachers associations.
Education services are supplied both by independent governments
such as school districts, and multipurpose governments, such as
counties, municipalities, and townships. There are 52,913 public
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school systems in the United States. The bulk of them, 50,887 are
independent school districts while the others are fiscally dependent
upon other governments. The nonindependent school departments
are few in number, but they are significant in size—they have 22
per cent of the school enrollment. Over time, the independent school
districts have been declining in number, because of increasing
consolidation of districts.
Two aspects of school finance are of special interest to this paper.
The school districts represent the pure form of a single function
government, with local control and relatively widely known opera-
tions. Their difficulties are an accentuation of the difficulties con-
fronting other local governments. The first question that I want to
raise is whether fiscally independent school districts fare better than
fiscally dependent school departments in raising funds. The second
question deals with the solution by the school districts of the problem
of their inability to overcome the constraints imposed by a lack of
consensus on the part of the voters.
A comparison between fiscally independent school districts and
fiscally dependent school departments is of interest since it indicates
whether the public will spend more for a public service when it is
presented as a single unit or as part of a package for which the
specific benefit of the marginal tax dollar is uncertain. The evidence
is far from weighty but it indicates that fiscally dependent departments
spend more per pupil than fiscally independent school districts.
"Woodward made an analysis of expenditures in 85citiesbetween
100,000 and 1,000,000 population over the period 1929—30 to
1943 44. During this period the mean per pupil expenditure was
highest in the fiscally dependent cities. They spent about 4 per cent
more than the independent districts in 1929—30 and nearly 12 per
cent more in
Ten of the 41 largest cities have municipal school departments.
They spent in 1952—53, $346.11 per pupil in average daily attendance
against $293.40 spent in the other 31 largest cities with independent
school districts.'0
Most states have independent school districts throughout the state.
Where municipal departments are permitted, they are frequently
°HenryB. Woodward, The Effects of Fiscal Control on Current School Expenditures,
Ph.D. thesis, Columbia, 1948, Cited in Paul R. Mort and Walter C. Reusser, Public
School Finance, McGraw-Hill, 1941, p. 60.
1OU.S.Office of Education, Biennial Survey of Education, 1953—54, Statistics of
City School Systems, pp. 36—45.
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associated with larger cities. New Jersey is a case where there
are independent and dependent systems at all size classes. The six
cities of over 100,000 had municipal school departments. They
spent $383 per ADA. In the remaining cities, the municipal school
departments spent $343 per ADA, while the independent school
districts spent $293 per ADA."
The evidence is not conclusive, but it does indicate that when a
government function is broken out of the complex matrix of the
multifunctioned government and becomes institutionalized in a
separate government it finds greater difficulties in maintaining levels
of services because of the fiscal constraints imposed by the necessity
of developing a consensus among knowledgeable voters.'2
Further evidence supporting the hypothesis that simple government
structures are subject to more severe constraints is given by the decline
in the fiscal independence of the school districts. In 1920, 14 per cent
of the public elementary and secondary school revenues were derived
from state taxes and appropriations. This increased to 39 per cent
in 1950, and for the last year for which we have complete information,
1953—54, it stood at 35.5 per cent,13 The secular shift of public
support of education to the state government which is less subject
to widespread knowledge and popular control is more clearly
demonstrated when we consider the pattern of state support among
the different states.
Table 14 shows that the poorer states, as measured by per capita
personal, income, make a greater effort to support education. The
poorer states spend 3.23 per cent of their personal income on educa-
tion against 2.60 per cent for the higher-income states. More
interesting is the division of fiscal responsibility among the local
governments and the distant state legislatures. In the high-income
states, local governments raised 62.0 per cent of their school revenues
while the poorer states raised only 38.7 per cent of their 'revenues
from local sources. The greater effort made by the poorer states to
support education is attributable to a shift of fiscal support from the
local to the more complex state government.
Ibid.Classification of fiscal dependence or independence made upon the basis
of the state school directory.
Theabove findings only refer to expenditures. They do not directly show that
nonindependent school departments provide better education.It is possible that the
political infiltration associated with the school department becoming part of a general
budget may result in poorer education. My only point is that the school alliance with
the professional politician eases their budget constraint.
U.S.Office of Education, Biennial Survey of Education in U.S., 1953—1954, p. 26.
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SOURCES: Personal Income: Survey of Current Business, September 1955, pp. 16—17.
School Revenues: U.S. Office of Education, Biennial Survey of Education, 1952—1954,
Ch. 2, pp. 70—1.
1 The twenty-four states with higher per capita personal incomes.
2 The twelve states in this group with higher percentages of school revenues receipts
to personal income.
It would be hazardous to extend without modification this piece
of school finance analysis to the proposed special districts and
authorities which many municipalities are seeking. First, most of
these special governments are not heavily dependent upon any
special taxes and therefore they are less subject to voters' constraints.
They frequently make use of user charges such as metered water,
bridge tolls, and leases at airports. Controlling as they do commodities
with inelastic demand, and assessing prices according to average
cost principles, they find littledifficulty remaining solvent and
encounter little political opposition. But what if these governments
were to extend their activities to include functions which necessitated
reliance on a tax, usually the property tax? Would they find severe
fiscal restraints ? There is no easy empirical answer, since these groups
have not been studied closely and the reported statistics lump under
the single heading of special districts a most heterogeneous group—
dominated by fire, and irrigation, and soil conservation districts.
Some indications that they might then be severely subjected to voters'
constraints can be inferred by their resistance to proposals to extend
theirscales of operations. For example, the New York Port
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Authority is opposed to moving into the areas of mass transportation
where financing methods other than average-cost pricing might
become necessary.
To summarize: The single-function governments which are fiscally
important in local finance (in 1957, the special and school districts
spent almost as much as the municipalities) are very limited in their
ability to mobilize their fiscal resources. They lack the freedom to
jockey for support of a composite program. Their escape from this
position is to depend upon support from more complex govern-
ments, the state, and to rely on pricing mechanisms which avoid the
problem of nonaccord between the distribution of the benefits from
the public services, and the costs of financing them.
7
One reaction of governments to the voters' constraints is the
substitution of pricing mechanisms for taxes. Prices have the great
virtue that they provide a means by which to measure the residents'
desires for the service, they are a flexible device to ration efficiently
the supply of public facilities and service, and if they are the basis
of financing a project they reduce voters' opposition since the
unbenefited voters are not being asked to pay. Prices may not be
efficient for all public services. However, there are several services
for which they would have all three of the above virtues. A research
study on the use of pricing mechanisms by governments would be a
great boon to municipalities. Too frequently, simple average-cost
prices are established which do not efficiently ration the supply, or
generate information about desires for the service. Sometimes, the
average-cost price does not free the government from seeking supple-
mental support from tax-raised funds, in which case they are returned
to the old problem of voters' constraints, albeit modified.
Accompanying the growth of pricing mechanisms, is the shift in
local debt from bonds backed by the tax base of the local govern-
ments to bonds backed only by earnings of specific activities or
facilities or special assessment. In 1940, the nonguaranteed debt was
6 per cent of the total long-term debt of local governments. This
percentage increased to 29 by 1957. A large part of the increase in
local debt was incurred by school districts which could only issue
bonds backed by the full faith and credit of governments. If we
consider the debt of all local governments, excluding school districts,
the nonguaranteed percentage increased from 6 to 43 between 1940
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TABLE 15
Municipal Nonguaranteed Debt and Services Charges




Revenues from Charges and
Miscellaneous as Percentage
of All General Revenues
Nonguaranteed Debt
as a Percentage of
All Long-Term Debt
All Cities 17.3 31.7






Under 25 22.1 48.3
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Census, Sunvnary of City Government Finances in 1957,
July 1958, pp. 11 and 15.
and 1957. Most of this increase was accounted for by municipal
and special district governments.'4
Of special interest for this paper is the reliance on prices and
nonguaranteed debt by size of city, a shown in Table 15. My
argument would lead to the expectation that the smaller and more
simple cities would feel a stronger voter constraint, and thereby would
be forced to rely more on pricing mechanisms and on nonguaranteed
debt. This expectation is confirmed. The smaller cities, those under
50,000, make a far greater use of nontax financing of local services
and facilities than the larger cities—those over 500,000. This despite
the fact that the larger cities had per capita municipal expenditures
twice that of the smaller cities. If the smaller cities tried to approach
the expenditure level of the larger cities, their reliance on nontax
financing would have to be still greater.
8.
Anotheradaptation pattern of the neighborhood-municipalities
to voters' constraints is the surrender of their fiscal independence.
The school district is the classic case of a transfer of fiscal support
to a more distant government, the state. There are persistent efforts
to construct a single unified metropolitan government with sufficient
fiscal str.ength and authority to plan and carry out plans for the
14Debtfigures for recent years can be gotten from the U.S. Bureau of Census annual
reports on Summaries of Government Finance. In earlier years they are available in their
annual reports on Government Debt.
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TABLE 16
Increases in Education and in All Other Grants
Between 1942 and 1957
(millions of dollars)









SouRcEs: Census Bureau publications:Historical Statistics of State and Local
Government Finances, 1902—1953, Table 2; StateGovernmentFinance in 1957, Tables 1,15.
interdependent metropolitan area. So far these efforts have borne
little fruit. Metropolitan government is still only on the banner of the
professional administrators. It has not found a place on the political
agenda. Although a metropolitan government remains nonexistent,
there is a transfer of fiscal functions to higher level and more complex
governments. The increasing role of the federal government in local
affairs is apparent. Similarly, the state government has grown relative
to the municipal governments in the last few decades, despite the
growth or urbanism.
The major shift from local to state support has been in the form
of the direct growth of state activities. Again, this can be related to
the difficulties of the local governments to muster the political support
to expand their services. The growth of the state relative to the local
has been in the direct provision of services rather than through
grants-in-aid. Table 16 shows that from 1942 to 1957 state payments
to local governments increased by $5.5 billions and federal grants
to states increased by $2.7 billions. Separating the grants between
those for education and all others, it is apparent that except for
education the state government has merely been a transfer agent
between the federal government and the local government. The
increase in federal grants to states for noneducational purposes has
been only slightly greater than the increase in grants by the states to
locals for noneducational purposes. Therefore, the increase in
noneducational grants by the states does not represent a transfer of
fiscal responsibility from the locals to the states. Educational grants
do represent a growth in the fiscal importance of the state relative
to local governments. The educational grants result in an increase in
the proportion of state and local taxes raised by the state government.
Other than education, the transfer of fiscal responsibility to the
states has taken the form of expanded services by the state govern-
ment. Transfers have more commonly occurred, as would be expected,
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TABLE 17
State and Local Payrolls and State Grants to Local Governments
as Percentages of Personal Income, 1957
. STATE AND LOCAL STATE GRANTS
TotalNoneducationLocal Non- All Non-
•Payrolls PayrollseducationalEducationaleducational
Higher Income
States 4.61 2.66 1.61 1.08 1.03
Higher effort 5.24 3.01 1.80 1.34 1.33
Lower effort 3.91 2.27 1.40 0.80 0.72
Lower Income
States 4.91 2.69 1.20 1.53 0.68
Higher effort 5.48 2.99 0.94 1.71 0.95
Lower effort 4.58 2.52 1.35 1.43 0.52
SouRcEs: Payrolls: U.S. Bureau of Census, U.S. Census of Government: 1957, Vol. II,
No. 1, Summary of Public Employment, 1958, Table 16. State Grants: U.S. Bureau of
Census, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957, 1958, p. 25. Personal
Income: Survey of Current Business, August 1958, p. 13.
where political resistance to local services is the greatest. This is
demonstrated in Table 17. Note that the aggregate noneducational
payrolls of state and local governments for both high- and low-
income states are a constant percentage of personal income. The
local noneducational payrolls alone do not show the same pattern..
In the states with lower incomes, the local noneducational payrolls
are a smaller percentage of personal income than in higher-income
states. The differences in local support of noneducational services
as revealed by these figures is almost identical with the differences
in local support of educational services as shown in Table 14.
Clearly, low incomes discourage local public support for public
services. The local resistance does not effectively restrain the state
government. Though local efforts remain the same for educational
and noneducational services, the reactions of the states are quite
different. For noneducational purposes, the state payrolls as a
percentage of personal income are distinctly greater for low-income
states than for higher-income states. The states spend more relative
to the local governments where local resistance to public services
because of low income is greatest. The relatively greater effort of
poor state governments results in the same amount of state and
local payrolls per dollar of personal income for both poor and rich
states.
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It is interesting that, although local efforts for the support of
education and noneducation services are the same, the total state
and local efforts by lower-income states relative to the higher-
income states, is much greater for education than noneducation.
Does this mean that it is easier to overcome the fiscal resistance of
local voters by means of a grant-in-aid program which retains a
modicum of local control, than by means of a direct transference
of functions to a higher government? This would seem to be a
reasonable hypothesis. Possibly it reflects the power of the educational
bureaucracy to exact support from the state while retaining its own
independence. In any case, the political dimension is necessary to
understand the fiscal problems of local governments.
COMMENTS
LYLE C. FITCH, Division of Administration, City of New York
In a general way, I concur in most of the conclusions reached by
Margolis in his interesting and ingenious paper. But I am uneasy
about some of the propositions which have led him to the con-
clusions.
I will comment, first, on the discussion of the structure of the
urban community, and second, on problems presented by deficiencies
of urban governmental machinery.
1.
Margolis' schematic pattern of the city is the conventional one of
a core, which is the population center, surrounded by rings in which
land-use intensity and population density decrease, and per capita
income increases, with distance from the center.
I think this schema hides about as much as it reveals about today's
rapidly changing metropolitan areas, certainly about New York.
First, there is great diversity in the size and configuration of metro-
politan areas. Second, most metropolitan areas are rapidly changing
shape.
Raymond Vernon points out in his recent CED pamphlet, The
Changing Role of the Central City, that many of the centrifugal
forces which tied industrial, commercial, and white collar employment
to the city's center are weakening. The concept of accessibility, on
which the Margolis scheme so heavily relies, must be redefined.
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Some types of employment are leaving central business districts
because new transportation forms make suburban locations more
accessible for their purposes than the central city with its character-
istic traffic jam. For many firms, accessibility which once depended
upon central concentrations is now provided in part by far-ranging
trucks and automobiles.
Along with this changing role of the central city goes a great
heterogeneity of developments in the older, built-up sections. As the
evolutionary process continues, buildings are progressively demoted
to less valuable uses; this trend in itself is a powerful developmental
force, comparable in some ways to the gradual exhaustion of agricul-
tural land. Building and land values tend to decline as obsolescence
progresses. We find the phenomenon in many older central cities of
vast stretches of so-called gray areas, characterized by obsolescent
buildings which are not removed simply because of the difficulty
and high cost of assembling land and preparing it for new uses.
Cost of clearance in Manhattan, for instance, may run to $200,000
or $300,000 an acre, whereas land can be had in the rings, with more
adequate accessibility for industrial purposes, for a small fraction
of this clearance cost.
Some central land, it is true, is being reclaimed for high-priced
office buildings and luxury apartment houses. Other land is being
rescued from advancing blight by urban redevelopment programs,
with the high cost of acquisition and clearance paid for in part by
the federal and local governments. But in most cities of my knowledge,
these countermovements have been quite inadequate—gray areas
are extending faster than they are being removed.
The gray area is typically a central city problem; it is one which
can be attacked only with great expense and effort; and it is one of
the main manifestations of governmental inadequacy in urban areas
today.
2.
InMargolis' system of things, the high-income groups are driven
out of the city by economic pressure of low-income groups, who
are willing to bid more per square foot for space. This abstraction
also hides about as much as it reveals. The concentration in the
center of low-income groups is due in part to the existence there of
large amounts of inferior housing, which they can command and for
which they have little competition from higher-income groups.
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Butis due also to a great complex of other factors, including
political and sociological factors.
3.
Margolis'main questions are concerned with the role of govern-
ment in the modern urban area.
Can present local governments effectively establish a framework for
economic and social activity within the City?
Answer: No.
Does existing governmental structure—limited as toterritorial
jurisdiction, functional specialization and restricted fiscal tools—
reduce the organizational efficiency of government?
Answer: Yes.
Great stress is put on fragmentation of governmental responsi-
bility in urban areas, among many governmental units. Individuals
with relativelysimilar preference-orderings, finditpossible to
cluster together. This weakens possibilities of agreement on public
programs in a metropolitan area, and weakens opportunities for
residents to use their superior fiscal capacity to carry out the
necessary organization of. the area.
Here is an implicit value judgment, basic to Margolis' thesis as
I understand it, on the point of whether values of the individualist,
society are served by allowing possibilities of choice as to levels of
government service by clusters of individuals of like tastes. Margolis
thinks not. But Charles Tiebout finds positive values in the ability
of like-thinking people to express their preferences by choosing
compatible local jurisdictions. (Two basic difficulties, of course, lie
in spillover effects which may benefit communities who do not pay
therefore, and in large disparities of fiscal capacity relative to "basic"
or "minimal" local needs, however defined.)
•Another point concerns the size of the package of governmental
services which are voted upon. The larger the package, within
reason, the more services which may be supplied, relative to the
situation where consumers vote on each service individually. To
quote: "The success of the multipurpose package is based on the
existence of consumers' surplus of enough voters for specffic projects
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so that they are willing to endorse an entire package rather than
lose the specific project."
But cannot this argument, based on a theory of log-rolling, be
turned around? Can we not equally well say that the failure of the
multipurpose package is due to the existence of the consumer's
deficits of enough voters against specific projects so that they are
willing to lose the entire package rather than take specific projects
which they do not desire to pay for, or to which they may violently
object? Logs may be rolled backward as well as forward, and
frequently are.
To illustrate my point, New Jersey, a large governmental unit and
one of the wealthiest states, is one• of the most niggardly in support
of governmental services. New York State, next door, is one of the
most generous.
New Jersey, I submit, is a case of backward log-rolling, where the
forces predisposed, or not indisposed, toward low state taxes find
more in common than the forces favoring more governmental
services.
I therefore would not want to gamble on a principle of organiza-
tion based on the thesis that larger jurisdictions and more complex
jurisdictions make it easier to extend the scope and quantity of
governmental services.
4.
Despite my questions about Margolis' specific points, I of course
agree that existing urban government is not adequate for modern
urban problems. New forms of organization are needed for certain
functions which can be handled efficiently only by jurisdictions
encompassing entire urban areas. Some services and benefits can
be provided most economically on a large scale, some are efficient
only when they are integrated, and some can be handled only by
having a central authority to resolve intra-area conflicts.
The New York City area, for instance, needs a unified program
for water supply, waste disposal, pollution of air and water, re-
creation, and a unified comprehensive transportation policy and
structure. Some or all of the same items are predominant needs of
most metro communities.
One great need to be served by area-wide governmental machinery
is that of efficient tax administration. Though the largest central
cities are big enough to avoid typical difficulties of local taxation
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which arise from small-scale administrative organization, smaller
jurisdictions generally are not. (The jurisdiction should be large
enough and isolated enough to prevent avoidance by persons and
firms moving over boundary lines or shopping outside the jurisdiction.
And it should be large enough to afford the specialists and machinery
necessary for efficient tax administration.)
Another major problem concerns the disparities of fiscal capacities
among fractionated governments.
5.
Icontinue with a specific example of local governmental in-
adequacy whose causes are considerably more varied and complex
than those discussed by Margolis. The Washington metropolitan
area is just winding up a three-year study of its transportation
requirements which indicates a need for constructing about $1.8
billion worth of highways and a $500 million rail transit system in
the next twenty years. The rail transit system, it is agreed, cannot be
entirely self-supporting; part Of the costs of construction will have
to be met by revenue sources other than fares. Unless the federal
government is wiffing to finance the entire system, the region itself
will have to put up a substantial amount to get the highways and rail
transit system built.
The bulk of construction costs will be for construction in the
District, while the bulk of the benefits will accrue to residents of
Maryland and Virginia using the system for the journey-to-work.
Increments to property values resulting from regional development
(made possible in part by transportation facilities) will be concen-
trated largely outside the District. Hence there is no neat formula
by which present local governments, acting by themselves, can match
costs and benefits. A region-wide tax or combination of taxes,
related as closely as possible to benefits, is indicated.
In addition to taxing powers, other powers would be required for
an efficient transportation system. These include the power to control
the flow of traffic on arterial roadways, the entry of vehicles into
congested areas, and, of course, regulatory controls over private
transit companies. Vesting such controls in a region-wide agency
impinges on the jealously guarded power of existing local govern-
ments, and of state regulatory bodies. The transportation agency
would also require the power to condemn land, another jealously
guarded prerogative.
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An organization capable of financing and operating the system,
in a region comprising parts of two states and the District of
Columbia, will have to be created.
The most adequate device would be a regional transportation
agency, with the powers mentioned above, created by an interstate
compact of the two states and the District of Columbia. But inter-
state compacts are always difficult to negotiate, and the greater their
proposed scope, the more difficult it is to set them up. No compact
agency to serve local areas has ever been endowed with taxing powers,
or with other powers as broad as those listed above. Add to other
obstacles, the low regard of the Virginia state government for the
interests of urban northeastern Virginia, the proprietary interests
of the federal government in the District, and matters relating to
income levels and racial composition of various sectors, and it
looks as if the cause of transportation improvement in the Washington
region may be stalled for a long time to come if it' has to wait on
an interstate compact agency.
The only alternative to an interstate compact organization is a
federal corporation, with the same territorial jurisdiction and the
same powers (except taxing power, which cannot be exercised by a
federal corporation). Such an agency could be created by an act of
only one legislature, the federal Congress. But here again, are
formidable obstacles. The corporation would need not only unusual
powers, but also generous grants of federal funds, since it could not
impose taxes. The very idea of having to live and share power with
a federal corporationanathema to many local politicians and
government officials. Some observers therefore see little more chance
in the foreseeable future for a federal corporation than fOr an inter-
state compact agency.
6.
Inconclusion, the..inadequacy of local government for the require-
ments of the urban age has many and varied roots. It is only one
example of the general tendency of development of social institutions
to lag behind technological and other developments, including
population growth. But the prospects for improvement ate not
entirely dark. There are encouraging notes in the widespread interest
in metropolitan problems, and moves in many metropolitan com-
munities, amounting at least to getting a toe in the water, for dealing
with them.
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WILLIAM F. HELLMUTH, Oberlin College and the University of
Wisconsin
Congratulations to Julius Margolis for a stimulating and, on
several points, a pioneering paper. The theoretical statement of the
relation of functional and spatial differentiation within metropolitan
areas to fiscal needs and resources is excellent. Comparison of the
criteria of welfare economics with those of political choice offers
an interesting and useful insight. Introduction of the concept of
"envy-equity" and broadening the horizons beyond the equity issue
are commendable.
The assignment in these comments, as I have interpreted it, is to
discuss the Margolis paper in light of the data and analysis developed
from the studies of the Cleveland metropolitan area.1 The Cleveland
metropolitan area is a large but relatively uncomplicated area,
entirely within a single state and with 95 per cent of the 1950
population in a single county.
The Cleveland METRO study offers mountains of data to verify
many of Margolis' points. The great diversity of municipalities
within a metropolitan area, for example, can be vividly documented.
Hunting Valley—the most exclusive residential village with dividend
and interest income averaging $7,000 per capita, residential assessed
valuation of $37,000 per residence on a 40 per cent assessment ratio,
and police service which includes delivery of the morning paper—
and Cuyahoga Heights—the epitome of the industrial enclave
with two huge steel plants to support 785 residents with per capita
municipal expenditures of $527 on a municipal tax rate of about
1/4 of 1 per cent on true value—represent the diverse but richest
suburbs. Oakwood with a per capita assessed valuation only one-
one-hundredth that of Cuyahoga Heights, and Woodmere which
is both small and poor requiring about a 1.5 per cent tax on true value
of property just to maintain a full-time police force, exemplify the
poorer communities.
The Cleveland study gives results which conflict with two of
Margolis' points.First,Margolis contends that single-purpose
'Cleveland Metropolitan Services Commission, a private, nonprofit research organiza-
tion, has published a series of studies on many aspects of the metropolitan problem.
For those relating especially to government finance in the metropolitan area, see
Sacks, Egand, and Heilmuth, The Cleveland Metropolitan Area: A Fiscal Profile (1958)
and Sacks and Helimuth, Financing Governments in a Metropolitan Area: the Cleveland
Area Experience (Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1960).
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governments find it more difficult to gain local tax support for their
programs. Independent school districts are cited as the prime example
of this situation. All school districts in Ohio are separate and inde-
pendent from other local governing bodies. School districts in the
Cleveland area find it easier to muster political support than do
the municipalities. Ohio has a limitation of ten mills on the property
taxes which may be imposed without a One of the few
advantages of this tax limitation is that it produces a scoreboard
showing the popular support for expenditures for different functions.
In Cuyahoga County over the five-year period 1953—57, the
municipalities put 126 operating levies on the ballot, of which 74
or 58.7 per cent passed,, while school boards presented 95 levies to
the voters of which 91 or 94.5 per cent passed, as shown in Table 1.
Of the 95 municipal bond issues, 68.3 per cent passed, but of the
72 school bond issues, 90.3 per cent passed. The percentage required
for passage is 50, 55, or 60 per cent of the votes cast, depending on
the sponsoring government, the purpose of the issue, the duration
of the tax rate, and the type of election. School issues polled more
popular support in every classification by percentage required.
County and municipal officials regard with envy the ease with which
school issues are passed.
And voter support for schools is strong despite the high level of
school tax rates relative to municipalities'. The school share is
exactly half of the average property tax rates in Cuyahoga County,
equal to the combined state, county, and average municipal rates.
The tax rate in 30 of the 32 school districts exceeds the comparable
municipal tax rates. And the school tax rates have increased more
rapidly than rates for municipal and county purposes, with schools
increasing their share of the property tax levy from 35 per cent to
50 per cent since 1940. State support for schools in Cuyahoga
County has decreased on a relative basis, from 22.6 per cent of total
revenue in 1940 to 16.5 per cent in 1956.
A check of the Census data which Margolis used at page 263 to
show that payroll per pupil for April 1957 was less in independent
than in dependent school districts, leads me to the opposite con-
clusion. My calculations indicate over $21 of payroll per pupil in
all independent school districts against less than $17 per pupil for all
dependent school districts, reversing the relationship shown in his
text. The Margolis figures show payroll per pupil comparing all


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































districts. Exclusion of the generally lower-cost dependent school
districts operated by county and township governments accounts
for the different results.
This evidence suggests that single-purpose governments with a
popular function may attract more support than governments
providing a complex of functions each with minority support.
A logical case can be made that state support for public schools
has increased in order to escape the disadvantages of the property
tax. Except for one or two states, the property tax is the sole local
revenue source available to independent school districts. When the
education function is included in the budget of municipalities or
counties, other revenue sources besides the property tax are usually
available. Thus, when a county or municipal budget includes the
education function, other local revenue sources are available to
supplement the property tax.
With inflation, the postwar bulge in school enrollments, and a
more widespread desire to equalize educational opportunities and
standards in public schools throughout the state, most states have
increased their aid to education in preference both to heavier local
dependence on the property tax and to providing other local revenue
sources to the independent school districts. State grants shift the
burden from the local property tax to sales, excise, and income taxes.
These taxes have advantages over the property tax in that they can
be administered more effectively and economically at the state level,
are more responsive automatically to increases in income and prices,
and avoid the sometimes harmful competition among jurisdictions
within the state to keep rates low. The effect of an intrastate educa-
tional equalization program shows clearly in Cuyahoga County.
The Ohio School Foundation Program, which provides minimum
aid to every school district and additional aid to the poorer districts
provided 34 per cent of the funds to support public schools in
state in 1957. But the Cleveland area school districts—richest in
the state in terms of local tax capacity measured by assessed property
value per pupil—received an average of only 17 per cent of their
revenues from the state.
The hypothesis that financing or functional responsibility is
shifted to higher levels of government to gain political support
seems to neglect the greater taxing capacity of the higher-level
governments. The Cleveland METRO staff report, for example, is
recommending that when substantial additional amounts of revenue
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are needed, a county-wide income tax would be preferable to new
taxes in the 58 municipalities and 32 school districts in the county.
T.his new tax would be available both to finance increased needs
and to correct the existing imbalance in revenue needs and capacities
between different jurisdictions.
The hypothesis that complexity of government organization
facilitates political support, though not borne out by schools, is
substantiated by comparing the tax support received by 36 villages
with that of the 21 cities excluding Cleveland. Villages generally
provide fewer and lower-quality services than cities in part due to
lower tax rates. The average millage levied by vifiages in 1956 was
5.3 mills compared with 10.0 mills in the cities.
Second, evidence from the Cleveland study suggests that the fiscal
position of the central city government relative to the suburbs is
more difficult than Margolis indicates. The Cleveland area conforms
to the quantitative data, presented in Table 11 of the original paper,
showing the greater per capita expenditures in the central city and
allegedly the even greater per capita revenue capacity. But taxable
real and tangible property, on which Margolis' data is less conclusive,
is the major local source of revenue. The county is the assessing
jurisdiction in Ohio. In Cuyahoga County, Cleveland has 58.6
per cent of the population and 67.8 per cent of the municipal current
operating expenditures (58.9 per cent including schools), but only
56.6 per cent of the assessed valuation. Despite the heavy concen-
tration of. commercial, industrial, and utility property in the central
city, the assessed valuation per capita is only $2,964 in Cleveland
against $3,066 in the entire county. County, state, and Census
sources 'indicate that assessment ratios in Cuyahoga County are
higher for commercial and industrial properties than for residences.
As residences constitute a higher proportion of the tax base in the
suburbs .thanin the central city, adjusting assessed values to full
values would show an even greater differential in favor of the suburbs
over Cleveland. Per capita .and per family income are also lower
in the central city than in the entire county, as shown in Table 2.
Thus the central city has a greater absolute need and a lower absolute
capacity in the Cleveland area. Margolis' data in Table 13 shows for
the San Francisco area also that average household income is lower
in the central city than in the suburbs.
Margolis' analysis explains the lower expenditures per capita
in the suburbs compared to the central city in terms of the simpler
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TABLE 2
Fiscal Indices of Central City and Suburbs
in Cleveland Metropolitan Area, 1956
Cleveland Suburbs
Population 926,052 654,501
Average income per capita $2,089 $2,590
Assessed value per capita $2,964 $3,210
Municipal expenditures per
Current operating $59.30 $39.80
Capital 18.00 18.20
Total 80.60 60.20
Municipal total expenditures to income 3.86% 2.32 %
Municipal tax rate (mills) 16.80 7.53
School expenditures per capitaa
Current operating $42.20 $60.30
Capital 3.00 23.50
Total 45.20 86.90
School total expenditures to income 2.16% 3.35%
School tax rate (mills) 12.80 17.58
School ADMb to population 12.9% 16.6%
Municipal plus school expenditures, per capitaa
Current operating $101.50 $100.10
Capital 21.00 41.70
Total expenditures 125.80 147.10
Combined total expenditures to income 6.02% 5.68 %
Combined tax rate (mills) 29.60 25.11
Interest expenses are not shown separately. Expenditures for transit, water, and
electricity are excluded.
bAveragedaily membership.
nature of government operations, making a coalition in support of
different functions less likely. This analysis neglects the different
needs and preferences for government services of the diverse neigh-
borhoods and jurisdictions. Higher total expenditures per capita in
the central city and industrial enclaves, represent a different product-
mix of services from that of the dormitory communities. The mix
differsboth in range and emphasis. The central city spends more for
welfare, urban renewal, slum clearance, police, and fire due to
greater traffic, different type of property, and the composition of its
population by employment stability, income level, and density. The
industrial enclaves had very high expenditures per capita for general
government, police, fire, streets, and total expenditures but little or
no spending for most other municipal functions. The municipal ex-
penditures of the business suburbs, other than the industrial enclaves,
are not distinguishable from the dormitory. communities in the
Cleveland area.
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The parts of the Margolis study comparing the central city and
the different classes of suburbs seems to cover only municipal
expenditures, and not school expenditures. The Cleveland area shows
a pattern of school expenditures almost diametrically opposed to the
pattern of municipal expenditures. Although municipal expenditures
are higher per capita and in terms of effort in the central city, school
expenditures are higher per capita and in terms of effort in the rest
of the county. Capital outlays, especially for schools, are sharply
higher outside the central city—$23.50 per capita in the suburbs
versus $3.00 in Cleveland. As school expenditures are larger now
than municipal spending, the current operating expenditures per
capita for municipal and school purposes combined are now about
equal in the central city and the suburbs. (See Table 2.) If capital
outlays are included, the suburban expenditures per capita are
$147.10 against $128.80 for the central city. The tax effort of the
central city is greater, however, due to its low capacity and less
borrowing.
Another point deserving comment isthe question whether
municipalities in metropolitan areas are becoming more diverse.
The evidence is not conclusive either in Margolis' paper or in the
Cleveland area. A number of factors and developments point toward
greater diversity:
1. Population growth is most rapid in the 36 villages, 21 of
which have areas of less than 5 square miles and another 10 of which
are between 5 and 10 square miles. The smaller the area, the more
likely only one or two neighborhoods and a narrow range of interests
will be included.
2. Almost no land area is left to enlarge existing municipalities.
Less than 15 square miles of area in Cuyahoga County is currently
outside municipalities. With municipal home rule protecting existing
municipalities no matter how small or how poor, the prospect of
reducing the number of municipalities is very dim.
3. The racial composition of the central city is steadily growing
more different from the suburbs. The nonwhite population in
Cleveland is now estimated at about 25 per cent of the total, compared
with 9.7 per cent in 1940 and 16.3 per cent in 1950. No more than 4
of the 57 suburban municipalities have over 5 per cent nonwhite
population. However, the future increase in the nonwhite population
due to in-migration is expected to slow down.
4. Much of the future population and economic growth in the
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Cleveland Metropolitan Area will take place outside of Cuyahoga
County. Lake County to the east, already included in the metro-
politan area by the Census definition, had less than 6 per cent of the
metropolitan population in 1950. Future growth will occur in several
counties to the south and west as well, complicating the problem
across county boundaries and involving adjacent metropolitan
areas, such as Akron.
On the other side, several factors suggest less diversity in the future:
1. Population growth and spread have converted Cuyahoga
County into an urbanized county. The greatest diversity of interests
exists between urban neighborhoods and rural villages and town-
ships. But the rural areas have almost disappeared. Only 0.02 of
1 per cent of assessed real estate valuation is agricultural. Only 2
villages out of the 58 municipalities have more than 10 per cent of
their real estate assessed values in agricultural uses. Growth has
created greater similarity of services from local governments in the
metropolitan area. This greater uniformity is also reflected in the
narrowing of the range of local property tax rates between different
jurisdictions in Cuyahoga County since 1940. Especially the very low
rates of the former rural areas have moved much closer to the mean
tax rates for cities and villages. The coefficients of dispersion for the
58 different municipal tax rates around the city and village means
have declined almost half since 1940.
2. The county has recently taken over responsibility for several
functions formerly performed by municipalities. Welfare adminis tra-
tion, Cleveland City Hospital, and schools for delinquent boys
and girls have been tr4nsferred to the county, with popular vote
supporting the additional county property taxes to finance these
functions.
3. In November 1958, the people of Cuyahoga County voted to
establish a county charter commission. This commission is now at
work on a charter which will be presented for approval or rejection
at the November 1959 election. To pass, the proposed charter
must be supported by a majority of voters in the central city—
Cleveland—and by a majority of voters in the rest of the county.
An amendment to the Ohio Constitution in 1957 removed the former
requirement that the voters in a majority of municipalities in the
county had to approve the charter. The importance of each neigh-
borhood under this procedure depends more on its voting strength
than on its existence as a separate political entity. A county charter
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thus offers real possibilities for more integrated government in the
Cleveland area.2
The popular vote on transfer of functions to the county and on
establishing a county charter commission indicatesMargolis'
"envy-equity" principle. Generally the vote in the lowest- and
highest-income neighborhoods favored the changes. The voters in
lower-middle income areas—who do not clearly see gains for
themselves, who perhaps see their relative position threatened, and
who are not motivated by noblesse oblige—have generally opposed
the changes.
My parting comment is directed to Margolis' first table, which
he introduces to show that local support of local government is
below prewar years. Use of the depression year .of 1932 as the first
year in the series, probably dictated by the availability of continuing
series for GNP and implicit price deflators, causes the decline in
local revenues and expenditures to appear larger than if any other
year of a local government census were chosen. My admittedly crude
estimates for 1922 and 1927 still show a decline but a much smaller
one than if 1932 is the starting point. (My calculations indicate
revenue from local sources of 5.9 per cent in 1922 and 7.6 per cent
in 1927, with direct expenditures of local governments 7.1 per cent
in 1922 and 8.4 per cent in 1927, each expressed as a percentage of real
gross national product to fit with Margolis' data in Table 1.)
A methodological question arises also about a real measure of
local government revenue as used in Table 1. Which is the best price
index to use to deflate government revenue? The implicit price
deflator for the appropriate government sector measures the real
purchasing power to the receiving government. The consumer price
index, however, would measure better the loss in real buying power
to the individual taxpayer. Some might prefer the implicit price
deflator for total GNP. In the Cleveland study the decision was to
deflate local government expenditures with the implicit price deflator
for state and local government purchases and to adjust local
revenues with the consumer price index. This procedure creates a
new gap between revenues and expenditures due to the two types of
"constant" dollars. We would be glad to get your reaction to this
method.
2Sincethis paper was presented, the proposed charter for Cuyahoga County was
defeated at the 1959 election, failing to receive a majority either in Cleveland or in the
county outside of Cleveland.
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WERNER Z. HIRSCH, Washington University and Resources for the
Future
Julius Margolis has courageously plunged into the difficult under-
taking of seeking an answer to the questions "What are the sources
of the fiscal crises of metropolitan areas ?"and"Is the crisis likely
to become more acute ?"IfI understand him correctly, his main
thesis can be summarized as follows: Spatial differentiation of
economic activity in metropolitan areas causes conflicts of interest
among individuals, particularly as taxes are not assessed in proportion
to benefits received. The smaller the local governments, the more
visible their actions, the more directly related to tax payments
specific public services, and the more government units in a metro-
politan area—the greater the frustration of local government, and
the greater the fiscalcrisis. On the other hand, "multipurpose
package" voting and ignorance of the people permit the resolution
of conflicts by the political process of persuasion and negotiation
and, thus, the alleviation of the fiscal crisis. To quote Margolis on
this latter point, "Ignorance and the acceptance of the rules of the
game implicit in majority rules permit the resolution of conflicts
by the political processes of persuasion and negotiation, while
knowledge of consequences and their implications for one's own
self-interest would lead to frustration of policy by focusing on possibly
irreconcilable conflicts."
My comments will attempt to examine the basis of two major
tenets of Margolis' thesis and their implications, and then consider
some issues connected with the framework for analyzing metro-
politan finance problems.
Package vs. Single Product
In analyzing the "normal" pattern of public choice between
"multipurpose package" and "single product," it appears useful
to distinguish between policy and legislation. Except for a few
"omnibus" bills of Congress, legislation, particularly on the local
level, is usually specific. On the other hand, there is available evidence
which indicates that people in voting for a party or candidate tend
to vote for the policy for which they think the party or candidate
stands. This too, however, is less true on the local than on the national
level. To me, it appears not so evident why "it is reasonable to
hypothesize that the greater the number of products offered in the
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package to the voter the greater the likelihood of adoption." Likewise,
more careful analysis is needed before we can be sure that "voters.
are willing to endorse the entire package rather than lose the specific
project (close to their heart)." A very large number of people called
upon to vote on local fiscal matters appear satisfied with the status
quo. Often no specific project is close to their heart. Furthermore, a
careful study remains to be made as to whether the following
hypothesis does not offer a better explanation: combining many
projects into one package affords strong political or special interest
groups an opportunity to seize on one issue, possibly a minor one,
dramatize it and defeat the entire package.
To back up his contention, Margolis states that the schools are the
major fiscal problem of local governments. As reason he cites that
the single purpose district permits voters to "readily develop a nega-
tive or positive attitude toward the extension of the school budget."
In this very characteristic, to my mind, can lie not only the weakness
but also the strength of the single purpose district. Again more
work appears in order before generalizations are possible. No doubt
there are other, perhaps more important sources of schools' fiscal
problems. Much of the difficulty of schools arises from the fact that
their budgetary needs are so great compared to other public services.
In suburbia often more than two-thirds of all current local government.
expenditures are for schools. For example, in St. Louis County,
Missouri, school districts spent during 195 1—55 an average of 66 per
cent of the total outlay by local units, compared to 17 per cent expended
by its 96 municipalities and 15 per cent by the county government.
Furthermore, in accordance with widespread state practices,
property tax limitations are applied to local governments. For
example, the permissible tax rate in Missouri for urban school
districts, other than St. Louis, is1 per cent of assessed valuation;
the limit for St. Louis is 0.89 per cent, and for other school districts
in Missouri it is 0.65 per cent. School districts may increase their
rates to three times the specified limit, but only by annual popular
vote. All school bond issues in Missouri must be submitted to a
popular vote and must be passed by a two-thirds majority, while the
total amount of indebtedness represented by general obligation
bonds cannot exceed 10 per cent of the assessed valuation of taxable
tangible property. It seems fair to say that restrictive tax and bonding
limits written into state constitutions are the results of package and
not single-product votes.
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As further evidence designed to support the hypothesis that simple
government structures are subject to more severe constraints, Margolis
presents mean per-pupil expenditure data for fiscally dependent
school departments and fiscally independent school districts. While
the first are somewhat higher than the second, I would suggest that
a simple comparison could be dangerous. States differ in their school
subsidy program. Our study of factors affecting expenditures for
public education appears to point to a host of factors which can
significantly bear on per pupil expenditures.' How treacherous simple
comparisons can be is illustrated in the St. Louis County experience
with fire protection. In 1952 and 1955, the fourteen fiscally dependent
fire departments spent on the average more per person than the
eighteen fiscally independent fire districts. And yet from 1952 to
1955, the latter's per capita expenditure increased more (10 per cent)
than that of the former (4 per cent). Our empirical analysis suggests
that the wealth of residents, service levels, extent of commerce and
industry, etc., greatly affect per capita expenditures for fire pro-
tection.
Margolis cites the heavy reliance of school districts on state subsidy
as further support for his thesis. If the relatively large state subsidy
for primary and secondary public education could be attributed to
the fact that this service is rendered to a large extent by fiscally
independent school districts (with single product votes), would we
not expect special single purpose districts (other than school districts)
to receive similarly important subsidies? But Census figures indicate
just the opposite. Thus, in 1957 intergovernmental revenue payments
for primary and secondary education, which was rendered only in
part by fiscally independent school districts, amounted to 42 per cent
of total school expenditures, while those to special districts not
engaged in education were merely 8 per cent of their expenditures.2
Ignorance vs. Knowledge
Little, if any, evidence is offered to support the thesis that the
ignorant voter helps solve local fiscal problems more than his
knowledgeable brother. The same holds for the claim that political
persuasion replaces rational self-interest.Isitreally truethat
'Werner Z. Hirsch, "Projecting Local Government Expenditures in Metropolitan
Areas," Proceedingsof the BusinessEconomics Section of the American Statistical
Association (1959).
2U.S.Bureau of' the Census, Summary of GovernmentalFinances in/957, August
1958, p. 22.
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self-interest must be subdued and that it cannot be made to work
toward the solution of metropolitan area problems?
Ends vs. Means—Question of a Framework
Margolis defines the fiscal crisis of local governments as a frantic
search for tax sources, with public support possibly falling off. Yet,
it is not clear that, if allowance is made for intergovernmental
revenues for schools, highways, etc., real revenue from local sources
as a percentage of real gross national product actually declined
between 1932 and 1957. Even without such adjustments, the per-
centage has been steadily increasing ever since the end of World
War II.
Such an approach, however, tends to look at metropolitan finance
as an end in itself, when for many purposes the opposite is much more
appropriate. I submit that in many respects metropolitan finance
is better understood and its problems can be more successfully
analyzed and attacked by looking at the dynamics of metropolitan
areas in general. Metropolitan finance then becomes one of a number
of different means toward a variety of ends. From the viewpoint of
the area, public services and taxes provide residents with a more or
less desirable place to live and work, and business and industry with
an environment for more or less profitable business operations.
Within such a broader framework one of the great metropolitan
area problems is to decide on the area's future image and the scope
and quality of public services compatible with it. Other significant
problems are developing means to improve fiscal capacity and finding
revenue to finance these services, and establishing an environment
which assures that they are provided efficiently.
How can imaginative and intelligent decisions be made as to what
the area should look like ten, twenty, or more years hence and
therefore what the appropriate fiscal needs of the area are? In
planning the future of the area, it is important that the officials and
the electorate have a reasonably clear picture of the main dimensions
of the area's health and well-being. Among them are economic growth,
increases in welfare, i.e., in per capita income, employment stability,
amenities of Jife, etc. Alternative plans can then be judged in the light
of the contributions they can be expected to make in specific terms.
In this connection, itis important to quantify the impact of
specific local fiscal steps on the area's health and well-being and
attempt to find a rough balance between benefits and costs. Such an
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impact analysis is rather complex. First the impact of a given fiscal
policy on private decision-makers must be assessed. How will their
decisions with regard to the area be affected? Second, the impact of
these induced private decisions on the region's health and well-being
must be traced and estimated.
An area's health and well-being is not only affected by its local
public and private activities. Exogenous forces beyond its control,
too, have a far-reaching impact. They can upset local plans and
create a variety of financial exigencies. For example, legislation in
connection with the Federal Housing Administration has made
possible the purchase of new homes with very small down-payments
and monthly payments not much larger than monthly rent. As a
result, many young families have been induced to become home
owners in suburbia, stretching themselves to their financial limit.
Not only is this legislation an important force contributing to urban
sprawl, but also it transplants large numbers of families to suburbia
at a time when their need for public services is at a maximum, while
their ability to pay for them is at a virtual minimum. This FHA
legislation, regardless of its other salutary effects,is no doubt
responsible for some of the financial difficulties of public schools.
Municipal governments would be wise to charge much larger
building permit fees designed to cover more of the capital expenditures
for schools, highways, fire houses, etc. However, it is fair to assume
that many governments will be reluctant to take such a step for fear
that other municipalities wifi be more accommodating and, thus,
grow more rapidly. Perhaps a better procedure would be to put at
the disposal of the FHA a revolving fund from which suburban
governments could borrow to help finance urban public capital
expenditures needed by those who were induced by it to buy new
homes in suburbia.
Another source of difficulty, though much less important, is that
many areas compete with one another for new industry by keeping
taxes to industry low or by even offering tax concessions to new-
comers. There exists also much confusion about the financial
blessings of industry. All too often merely the tax of the
plant are compared with the costs of providing it with public services.
A proper analysis would attempt to estimate direct and indirect
changes in local economic activity brought about by the new plant.
Once this was done, receipts and expenditures of the various govern-
ments associated with these activities would be estimated, added,
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and compared. This final figure alone can indicate whether the new
industry is a fiscal asset or liability.
Within this framework, what are possible vistas to the solution
of metropolitan finance problems and what are their chances for
success? I admit that philosophically my position stems from
inherent, though somewhat moderated, optimism, and from a deep
conviction that people and governments are fundamentally eager to
make rational decisions. During the next decade or two, the per-
fection of a well-conceived and powerful general framework for
making intelligent decisions on metropolitan area problems should
be in our reach. Appropriate data should become available to
implement important parts of it. With such help imaginative and
rational solutions to metropolitan problems in general and fiscal
problems in particular must and can be .found. It should become
increasingly possible to show the electorate that the individual's
welfare is closely tied to that of the entire area. Once we can assess
the indirect effects of local fiscal and other action, and cost and
benefits of specific projects can be estimated and more adequately
shared, I would hope that conflict-reconciling policies can be ad-
vanced. When we can show how much one section or industry of
the area depends upon others and how apparently convenient short
term temporary solutions can produce serious long term disadvantages
and losses, appropriate action will, I trus1, be forthcoming.
For instance, the St. Louis study made two empirical stabs at
this issue. To illustrate the economic interdependence of the area,
regardless of geographical location, it estimated the number of
persons directly and indirectly employed by a large brewery and
determined their place of residence. Located in the heart of the core
city, it employed 6,000 employees (about 4,800 of whom lived in the
core city itself). Directly and indirectly it provided employment for
about 6,800 core-city residents, about 2,600 residents of St. Louis
County and about 900 residents of the Illinois counties in the metro-
politan area.
Another attack relied on the regional input-output table to show,
on an industry-by-industry basis, the direct and indirect employment
and income impacts of alternative industrial development policies.
Both types of information can help convince the voters that the
entire area's welfare and growth is their concern. For example,
public measures hurting the brewery enough so as to force it to
move part or all its operations out of the area would have serious
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repercussions for many residents of other municipalities in the area.
But even without such a detailed study, it is not too difficult to show
that low service-levels in some of the area's police departments can
threaten much of the area with blossoming crime and high theft
insurance rates.
No doubt there will be occasions when personal and public interests
will seem irreconcilable. In such cases, higher levels of government
will have to be called upon to establish an environment which can
facilitate a creative resolution. Before this can be done, we must
attain a better understanding of the exogenous effects of state and
federal activities upon metropolitan areas. This is necessary also for
another reason. As time goes on, the political power of metropolitan
America will grow and the national government will become more
and more responsive to the problems of metropolitan areas. At
the same time, it will become increasingly important that the relation-
ship between local public and private policies and the balanced
growth of the national economy be more closely watched.
While state and federal government should play an important
coordinating role, local governments should be encouraged to be
increasingly active in fields to which they are suited. Let us not forget
that,fundamentally,local governmentsoffertheclosest and
potentially best link between people and government. In a demo-
cracy this link deserves continuous strengthening. Very large local
governments often prove unresponsive to the needs and desires of
the people.3 Then the people tend to lose interest and their attitude
to local officials and their tax needs can become negative. Efficiency
considerations may not call for very large governments. The St.
Louis study has shown that there are hardly any significant economies
of scale in local government services. Exceptions are for water supply
and sewage disposal.
There is, of course, a strong tradition of local self-government in
the United States, which will make difficult, for instance, any
attempted shift of land-use planning from a local to a higher level
of government. But because of great differences of wealth and the
conviction that every citizen should benefit from at least a minimum
service level, the tax base of metropolitan areas or whole states
should be pooled to underwrite a floor below which local public
Lennox L. Moak, "Some Practical Obstacles in Modifying Governmental Structure
to Meet Metropolitan Problems," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, February
1957, p. 611.
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services cannot falL Then it will be up to the specific community
to poll its electorate and decide on service levels for schools, fire
protection, refuse collection, etc., above the prevailing floor, and
tax themselves accordingly.
However, some functions, such as traffic and transit and industrial
development and planning, are area wide, and they must be handled
on an area-wide basis. Other services, such as water supply and
sewage disposal appear to benefit from economies of scale and can
be most efficiently provided on an area-wide basis. In these cases,
multipurpose districts and other arrangements can help meet these
challenges and provide for the necessary financing.
The hope to the solution of metropolitan finance problems, to
my mind, lies in more knowledge, which should enable us to weigh
intelligently the local government services we desire against our
ability to afford them. Then we can more judiciously establish
priorities and plan for needed sources of additional revenue, in
ways likely to be acceptable to an informed electorate.
MORRIS BECK, Rutgers University
The Margolis paper is a solid contribution to the literature on
local public finance. However, his choice of 1932 as a standard
for comparing the relationship between local public expenditures
and GNP is unfortunate, for a longer view tells a somewhat different
story. Direct expenditures of local government rose from 5 per cent
of GNP in 1913 to 7 per cent in 1927. The relatively high ratios of
the thirties are attributable to the depressed level of total output.
Since World War II, the local-expenditure component of GNP
has again exhibited an upward trend with the ratio approaching
seven per cent. Data for years prior to 1932 are shown below:
191319221927
Gross national product, bil. of $ 40.069.990.9
Direct expenditures of local governments,
bil. of $ 2.0 4.6 6.4
as %ofGNP 5.0 6.6 7.0
Local government revenues from own sources,
bil. of $ 1.7 3.8 5.7
as %ofGNP 4.3 5.4 6.3
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SouRcEs:Grossnational product: J. F. Dewhurst and associates,
America's Needs and Resources: A New Survey, New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1955, Appendix Table 4-2. Based on
unpublished data from Simon Kuznets.
Local revenues and expenditures:U.S. Bureau of Census,
Historical Statistics on State and Local Government Finances,
1902—1953, Table 3.
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